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CHARGING ON THE MARGIN
PAUL T. CRANE*
ABSTRACT
The American criminal justice system has experienced a signifi-
cant expansion in the number and severity of penalties triggered by
misdemeanor convictions. In particular, legislatures have increas-
ingly attached severe collateral consequences to misdemeanor of-
fenses penalties such as requirements to register as a sex offender,
prohibitions on owning or possessing a firearm, and deportation.
Although there is a wealth of scholarship studying the effect this
development has on defendants and their attorneys, little attention
has been paid to the impact collateral consequences have on prosecu-
torial incentives. This Article starts to remedy that gap by exploring
the influence that collateral consequences exert on initial charging
decisions in low-level prosecutions.
Critically, the ability to impose certain collateral consequences
through a misdemeanor conviction unlocks an array of additional
charging options for prosecutors. As a result, prosecutors are now
more likely to engage in a practice I term strategic undercharging.
A prosecutor engages in strategic undercharging when she charges
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a lesser offense than she otherwise could, but does so for reasons that
advance her own prosecutorial aims and not as an act of grace or
leniency. In other words, prosecutors can sometimes gain more by
charging less. By explaining why (and when) prosecutors are likely
to engage in strategic undercharging, this Article complicates the
conventional wisdom that prosecutors reflexively file the most severe
charges available.
This Article also proposes that collateral consequences be factored
into the determination of what procedural safeguards are afforded
a criminal defendant. Under existing law, collateral consequences
are generally deemed irrelevant to that inquiry; the degree of proce-
dural protection provided in a given case turns exclusively on the
threatened term of incarceration. Changing this approach could have
several salutary effects on the administration of collateral conse-
quences. At a minimum, it would honor a basic principle underlying
our criminal justice system: the threat of serious penalties warrants
serious procedures.
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INTRODUCTION
Misdemeanor or felony? That is a question prosecutors routinely
ask themselves when deciding what charges to file in a given case.
And the answer is important, for misdemeanor prosecutions and
felony prosecutions differ in significant ways. Among other things,
felonies threaten more severe penalties than misdemeanors, but
they also trigger more procedural safeguards.
Accordingly, when a prosecutor is deciding whether to bring a
felony or misdemeanor charge, she generally must determine
whether the ability to impose heightened penalties is worth the
costs generated by the more demanding procedures. Sometimes the
answer is obvioushomicide will be charged as a felony, jay-
walking as a misdemeanor. But often the answer is not so clear. For
many cases, the alleged conduct could plausibly be charged either
as a felony or as a misdemeanor. In those circumstances, prosecu-
tors must decide whether the ability to impose felony penalties is
worth enduring felony procedures.
That, at least, is the choice prosecutors traditionally faced when
charging on the margin. Over the last two decades, however, the
American criminal justice system has experienced a significant
expansion in the number and severity of penalties triggered by
misdemeanor convictions.1 Specifically, legislatures have increas-
ingly attached severe collateral consequences to misdemeanor
offensesconsequences that formerly were triggered only by felo-
nies.2 For example, misdemeanor convictions can now lead to a
defendant being required to register as a sex offender, prohibited
from owning or possessing a firearm, or deported.3
This Articles primary claim is that attaching those sorts of col-
lateral consequences to misdemeanor offenses provides prosecutors
with strong incentives to charge a borderline case as a misdemeanor
1. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
2. Collateral consequences are sanctions that fall outside the sentencing authority of the
trial court. Some prominent examples include disenfranchisement, sex offender registration,
and firearm prohibitions. They are distinct from a convictions so-called direct consequences,
which include incarceration, fines, and terms of probation. For more on the difference between
collateral and direct consequences, see infra Part I.A.
3. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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rather than a felony. This claim rests principally on two widely
accepted facts.
First, in many criminal cases, the most significant penalty at
stake is a collateral consequence rather than incarceration.4 This is
especially true for cases involving relatively low-level prosecutions,
which I consider for the purposes of this Article to be prosecutions
for either a low-grade felony or a misdemeanor. In those cases, a
collateral consequence will often be a prosecutors most potent and
enduring sanction.
Collateral consequences can frequently be used to further a
prosecutors sentencing aims, including the standard goal of re-
ducing threats to public safety.5 Such consequences take on even
more significance in low-level prosecutions given their relative
duration. Although incarceration terms for low-level convictions
typically top out at a couple of monthsand rarely more than a few
yearsseveral key collateral consequences last for decades or even
life.6 For example, the obligation to register as a sex offender lasts
for a minimum of fifteen years and sometimes for life.7 Firearm
prohibitions are typically lifetime bans.8 And deportation results
in permanent exclusion from the United States.9 In short, as the
drafters of the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act
4. Many criminal defendants are sentenced to little or no jail time upon conviction. See
Gabriel J. Chin, What Are Defense Lawyers For?Links Between Collateral Consequences and
the Criminal Process, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 151, 153 nn.19-21, 54 n.22 (2012) (observing that
79 percent of all convictions are for misdemeanors and that approximately only 20 percent of
those cases result in any term of incarceration; also observing that 60 percent of all felony
convictions result in little or no incarceration). But nearly every conviction carries with it one
or more collateral consequences. See Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry
and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214 (2010) (All indi-
viduals convicted of criminal offenses, regardless of their sentences, are forced to confront the
various collateral consequencesadditional legal penaltiesthat result from their con-
victions.).
5. See infra notes 83, 90 and accompanying text.
6. Chin, supra note 4, at 153-54.
7. Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in
SexOffender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1087 (2012).
8. Conrad Kahn, Challenging the Federal Prohibition on Gun Possession by Nonviolent
Felons, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 113, 113-14 (2013).
9. See Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice
for Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 9-11 (2012).
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correctly observed, collateral consequences in many instances are
what is really at stake, the real point of achieving a conviction.10
The second key point involves the relationship between collateral
consequences and adjudicatory procedures. Collateral consequences
are generally deemed irrelevant for determining what procedural
safeguards must be afforded a criminal defendant.11 Felony defen-
dants possess a bundle of heightened procedural entitlementssuch
as rights to a grand jury, a preliminary hearing, increased discov-
ery, and a jury trialthat misdemeanor defendants are often
denied.12 Critically, the fact that a misdemeanor conviction will
result in a severe collateral consequence does not trigger any
heightened procedural protections.13
Given these two factsthat collateral consequences are often the
most important component of a criminal prosecution and that they
do not trigger heightened procedural protectionsit should become
clear how the attachment of severe collateral consequences to
misdemeanor offenses affects prosecutorial incentives. Prosecutors
are more likely to file misdemeanor charges because they can still
achieve the penalty they desire without having to endure the
greater costs generated by felony prosecutions.14
At first blush, the choice to file a misdemeanor charge involving
a severe collateral consequence may appear to be a win-win for both
sides: prosecutors can pursue the case in a more efficient manner,
10. UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT, Prefatory Note at 4 (NATL
CONFERENCE OF COMMRS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010) [hereinafter UNIF. ACT]; see also Chin,
supra note 4, at 161-62 (Congress and state legislatures have made imposing collateral
consequences on individuals one of the central functions of the criminal justice system.);
Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Con-
sequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699 (2002) ([T]he imposition of collateral
consequences has become an increasingly central purpose of the modern criminal process.).
11. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part II.B. To be clear, not all misdemeanor defendants are deprived of all
such safeguards. For example, some misdemeanor defendants enjoy a constitutional right to
a jury trial. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) (holding that de-
fendants charged with an offense that threatens more than six months imprisonment have
a right to a jury trial).
13. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1325 (2012).
14. The incentive to file misdemeanor charges can be further strengthened by the fact that
misdemeanors are often easier to prove than felony offenses. Among other things, misde-
meanor offenses tend to have fewer elements and relaxed mens rea requirements. See infra
notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
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and the defendant is exposed to less potential incarceration.15 But,
as is frequently the case with first glances, the full picture is more
complicatedespecially for criminal defendants. The decision of
what charge to initially file can have a domino effect on nearly every
other aspect of the case: the procedures afforded the defendant, the
identity of the prosecutor handling the case, the identity of the de-
fense attorney charged with holding the government to its burden
(or negotiating a favorable plea), and the identity of the judge
managing the case to its conclusion.16 On each of those fronts, the
defendant who is charged with a misdemeanor may be left at a
greater disadvantage than if he had been charged with a felony.
Felony defendants enjoy a bundle of procedural safeguards that
misdemeanor defendants typically do not.17 These safeguards are
designed not only to ensure fair and accurate adjudications but also
to provide defendants with meaningful bargaining chips during
negotiations.18 Moreover, misdemeanor prosecutors are usually the
most junior members of the office and tend to be harsher than their
felony colleagues.19 They are accordingly less likely to bargain away
potential penalties on equitable grounds alone.20 As for misdemean-
or defense attorneys, they tend to be the least experienced while
carrying the most voluminous caseloads.21 Consequently, a mean-
ingful vetting of the governments case is usually the exception and
not the rule. Finally, misdemeanor courts suffer the most acute
docket pressures, meaning that those judges are likely to prioritize
speed and docket clearance above all else.22
This Article proposes that collateral consequences be considered
when determining what procedural safeguards must be afforded
defendants. Under existing law, that determination rests almost
entirely on the maximum term of incarceration authorized by the
charged offense. But this longstanding approach fails to reflect an
15. See Chin, supra note 4, at 153-54.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1151-52 (2008).
19. See infra Part III.C.
20. See Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors Syndrome,
56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1087-88 (2014).
21. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
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important new reality: severe penalties in the form of collateral
consequences are no longer reserved for felony convictions but are
now triggered by misdemeanor convictions as well. As detailed
below, adoption of this proposal could have several salutary effects
on the administration of collateral consequences. At a minimum, it
would honor a basic principle underlying our criminal justice sys-
tem: the threat of serious penalties warrants serious procedures.
By examining how the attachment of certain collateral conse-
quences to misdemeanor offenses influences prosecutorial charging
decisions in low-level prosecutions, this Article makes two contri-
butions to the scholarly literature.
The first is to enrich our understanding of the various charging
options available in a prosecutors toolbox. Much ink has been
spilledand rightly soabout the strategy known as overcharg-
ing.23 This Article identifies an additional charging tactic that has
eluded scholarly attention thus fara practice I term strategic
undercharging. A prosecutor engages in strategic undercharging
when she charges a lesser offense than she otherwise could, but
she does so for reasons that advance her own prosecutorial aims
and not as an act of grace or leniency. The conventional wisdom,
which is rooted in the lessons of overcharging, is that prosecutors
file the most severe charges available.24 This Article complicates
that narrative by explaining why, at least in certain contexts,
23. At the risk of oversimplification, a prosecutor engages in overcharging when she
charges a case more severely than she ultimately thinks is warrantedby filing either more
charges or a single charge at a higher level than she ultimately thinks the case merits. The
prosecutor can then use the threat of unduly harsh potential punishments as leverage in
bargaining, offering substantial so-called concessions that merely lead to convictions and
sentences only on the warranted charges. Bowers, supra note 18, at 1155.
For a very small sampling of the extensive literature examining overcharging, see Albert
W. Alschuler, The Prosecutors Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 85-105 (1968)
(explaining the difference between horizontal overcharging and vertical overcharging); Tracey
L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with
Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 862-73 (1995); Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1960-65 (1992).
24. See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR31(2009) (Prosecutors routinely engage in overcharging, a practice that involves
tacking on additional charges that they know they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt
or that they can technically prove but are inconsistent with the legislative intent or otherwise
inappropriate.); Meares, supra note 23, at 868-69 (claiming that [o]vercharging is systemic
and that prosecutors often believe that it is in [their] best interests to charge the defendant
with the most serious and as many crimes at the outset of the case).
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prosecutors will not reflexively file the most serious charge pos-
sible.25 Prosecutors will sometimes exercise their charging preroga-
tive by filing a lesser charge and, in so doing, gain the strategic
advantage that comes from significantly reducing a defendants
procedural entitlements.
The second contribution that this Article makes is to shine a light
on the relationship between collateral consequences and procedural
safeguards. Scholars have thoroughly examined collateral conse-
quences and the right to counsel, including the advice defendants
are constitutionally entitled to receive about potential consequences
of conviction.26 But whether potential collateral consequences should
impact a defendants procedural entitlements has escaped sustained
scholarly scrutiny. This Article begins to remedy that gap by
interrogating the continued wisdom of relying solely on potential
imprisonment as the metric for determining the procedural safe-
guards afforded a defendant.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides background
information about collateral consequences, their expansion into the
universe of misdemeanor offenses, and their relative importance to
prosecutors in low-level cases. Part II examines the incentives that
25. See infra Part II.
26. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and
Collateral Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675 (2011); Chin, supra note 4; Alice
Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 585 (2011); Chin &
Holmes, supra note 10; John D. King, Beyond Life and Liberty: The Evolving Right to
Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 28 n.170 (2013); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively
Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95
IOWA L. REV. 119 (2009) [hereinafter Roberts, Ignorance]; Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice,
Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693 (2011); McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A
Criminal Defense Attorneys Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy,
36 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 479 (2005). The recent scholarly focus on defense counsel and advice is
unsurprising given that it was the subject at issue in Padilla v. Kentucky. See 559 U.S. 356,
359-60 (2010).
By contrast, examination of the influence that collateral consequences have on prosecutors
and their charging decisions has been minimal. See, e.g., MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL.,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 8:3
(2013) ([T]here has been little attention paid to whether prosecutors should take collateral
consequences into account when making charging decisions.); Altman, supra note 9, at 8
(The role of the prosecutor ... has been largely unaddressed in the literature and advocacy
materials that have emerged since Padilla.). Altmans article appears to be the main
exception to this trend. However, her article focuses exclusively on the role deportation plays
during plea bargaining and not its impact on initial charging decisions. See id. at 7.
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lead prosecutors to engage in strategic undercharging when a severe
collateral consequence is triggered by a misdemeanor offense. Part
III explores some of the ripple effects caused by a decision to file a
misdemeanor instead of a felony. Part IV explains why collateral
consequences should be considered when determining what proce-
dural safeguards are afforded a defendant.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
This Part describes the key role collateral consequences often play
in low-level criminal prosecutions. Section A summarizes the dis-
tinction between collateral and direct consequences. Section B
explains that misdemeanor offenses increasingly trigger significant
collateral consequences, thereby eroding the sharp felony-misde-
meanor divide that previously existed for collateral consequences.
Section C identifies the collateral consequences that have the most
salience from the perspective of prosecutors. Finally, Section D de-
scribes why prosecutors often view the imposition of one or more
collateral consequences as the core objective of many low-level pro-
secutions.
A. Collateral Consequences vs. Direct Consequences
The legal consequences that flow from a criminal conviction are
often divided into two groups: direct and collateral.27 Although there
27. See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences
of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 670, 678 (2008). Of course, criminal convictions can also have significant nonlegal
consequences, including adverse effects on private employment prospects and various forms
of social stigma. See John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1037, 1049-55 (2009) (Researchers have discovered that any amount of incarceration creates
a significantly higher likelihood that ex-inmates will suffer a variety of health-related,
economic, and social harms with substantial negative hedonic consequences.). See generally
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) [hereinafter INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT]; Wayne A.
Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103 (2013); Michael Pinard, An
Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry
Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 624 n.1 (2006)
(collecting sources). Although the term collateral consequences has occasionally been used
to refer to nonlegal consequences, my use of the phrase is limited to a convictions legally-
imposed consequences. See LOVE ET AL., supra note 26, § 1:8.
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is some dispute over how to define each category precisely,28 the best
rule of thumband the one that the Supreme Court suggests in its
landmark decision in Padilla v. Kentuckyis that direct conse-
quences are limited to those matters within the sentencing author-
ity of the state [or federal] trial court.29 A collateral consequence,
by contrast, is any sanction or disability imposed by law as a result
of a criminal conviction that is in addition to the convictions direct
consequences.30 In other words, collateral consequences are not
part of the explicit punishment handed down by the court; they stem
from the fact of conviction rather than from the sentence of the
court.31
There is general consensus that incarceration, fines, criminal
forfeiture, and terms of probation or supervised release are all direct
consequences of conviction.32 Collateral consequences are generally
understood to include sex offender registration, civil commitment,
civil forfeiture, firearm prohibitions, disenfranchisement, preclusion
from juror service, bans on running for public office, disqualification
from public benefits (such as public housing or food assistance),
ineligibility for business and professional licenses, termination or
limitation of parental rights, andfor noncitizen defendants de-
portation.33
28. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364 n.8; Roberts, supra note 27, at 689-93 (detailing how
courts have used at least three different formulations when articulating the line between
direct and collateral consequences).
29. 559 U.S. at 364. Commentators have similarly emphasized the role and authority of
the sentencing court when attempting to delineate the realm of collateral consequences. See
LOVE ET AL., supra note 26, § 1:8 ([W]e endorse collateral consequences as a generally
serviceable (if not entirely precise) term to describe the range of legal penalties and
disabilities that flow from a criminal conviction over and above the sentence imposed by the
court.). A focus on the sentencing authority of the trial court makes particular sense given
the origins of the collateral consequence rule. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 510(d), 121
Stat. 2534, 2544 (2008); UNIF. ACT, supra note 10, § 2(1)-(2).
31. Pinard, supra note 27, at 634.
32. See Roberts, Ignorance, supra note 26, at 124.
33. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1108 n.5 (2013); Padilla, 559 U.S. at
376 (Alito, J., concurring); Chin & Holmes, supra note 10, at 705-06.
Some collateral consequences are mandatory in nature, whereas others afford the perti-
nent decision maker some degree of discretion when determining whether to apply them.
The former, which are also known as collateral sanctions, typically apply immediately
and automatically upon conviction. See Court Security Improvement Act of 2007
§ 510(d)(2). Common examples include sex offender registration, disenfranchisement, and
firearm prohibitions. Discretionary disqualifications, on the other hand, involve penalties
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The distinction between direct and collateral consequences first
gained legal prominence following the Supreme Courts decision in
Brady v. United States.34 Brady established that, in order to comply
with the Due Process Clauses voluntariness requirement, a trial
court needs to ensure only that a defendant is aware of the direct
consequences of conviction before entering a guilty plea.35 In other
words, a trial court has no obligation to inform a defendant of a con-
victions potential collateral consequences before it accepts the plea
as valid.
Although Brady involved only a trial courts constitutional duties
during plea colloquies, it reflected a view that later took root in
several other criminal law domains: a convictions collateral conse-
quences do not warrant the same degree of procedural attention as
a convictions direct consequences.36
B. The Erosion of the Felony-Misdemeanor Line
The classification of offenses as felonies or misdemeanors has
long been a foundational aspect of the American criminal justice
system.37 Among other things, the penalties facing the defendant
typically turned on that classification.38 In most jurisdictions, fel-
onies are defined as offenses that authorize more than one year of
imprisonment, whereas misdemeanors are offenses that authorize
no more than one year of imprisonment.39
or disabilities that an administrative agency, official, or a court in a civil proceeding is
authorized, but not required, to impose on an individual convicted of an offense. Id.
§ 510(d)(3); see STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS & DISCRETION-
ARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS, § 19-1.1 (AM. BAR ASSN 2004).
34. 397 U.S. 742 (1970); see also Chin & Holmes, supra note 10, at 706, 726-30 (discussing
Brady). Brady was not, however, the first time that the Supreme Court had considered the
potential relevance of collateral consequences. In a line of cases beginning in the 1940s, the
Supreme Court held that a criminal defendants appeal of his conviction was not rendered
moot by the completion of his sentence of incarceration, so long as he remained subject to
potential collateral consequences from the challenged conviction. See Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40, 53-55, 57-58 (1968) (summarizing earlier decisions); Fiswick v. United States, 329
U.S. 211, 222 (1946).
35. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1957)).
36. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 10, at 703-08.
37. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.8(c) (3d ed. 2007).
38. See id.
39. See id.
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Although the line formally dividing felonies and misdemeanors
is a prison-centric one, a substantial part of what previously dis-
tinguished felonies from misdemeanors was the number and sever-
ity of collateral consequences that flowed from a conviction.40 Until
relatively recently, only a felony conviction could trigger the ma-
jority of collateral consequences.41 As Chief Justice Warren observed
in 1960, [c]onviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person
which not only makes him vulnerable to future sanctions through
new civil disability statutes, but which also seriously affects his
reputation and economic opportunities.42
Since the 1990s, however, more and more collateral consequences
are triggered by misdemeanor convictions.43 As a result, the sharp
40. Indeed, this historic divide dates back to the English common law, where [n]o crime
was considered a felony which did not occasion a total forfeiture of the offenders lands, or
goods, or both. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 439 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 499 (1885)).
41. See King, supra note 26, at 32 (Conviction of serious crime has long carried the
consequence of civil death, by which the offender ... forfeited certain fundamental social
rights. But whereas the historical phenomenon of civil death was limited in the past to the
most serious categories of criminal activity, the current trend over the last quarter-century
has been to alienate and exclude offenders through collateral consequences, even when
convicted of very minor convictions.) (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Walter Matthews Grant et
al., Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV.
929, 955-56 (1970) (outlining the breadth of civil disabilities statutes imposing collateral
consequences on convictions). To be sure, some misdemeanor offenses resulted in collateral
consequences as well. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 n.11 (1972) (Powell,
J., concurring) (A wide range of civil disabilities may result from misdemeanor convictions,
such as forfeiture of public office, disqualification for a licensed profession, and loss of pension
rights.) (citations omitted). But the increase in collateral consequences attaching to mis-
demeanors and minor convictions is relatively recent. See Pinard, supra note 4, at 1214-15
([W]hat is relatively new is the scope of collateral consequences that burden individuals long
past the expiration of their sentences and which ... frustrate their ability to move past their
criminal records. At no point in United States history have collateral consequences been as
expansive and entrenched as they are today.); see also King, supra note 26, at 17-33 (de-
scribing the dramatic increase in scope and severity of collateral consequences of minor crim-
inal convictions).
42. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); see also
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (highlighting the
gravity of an offense being transformed from a misdemeanor into a felony because of all the
serious collateral consequences that a felony conviction entails); Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21, 28 n.6 (1974) (Moreover, even putting to one side the potentiality of increased
incarceration, conviction of a felony often entails more serious collateral consequences than
those incurred through a misdemeanor conviction.).
43. See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 153, 154-55 (1999) (discussing
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ness of the distinction between felonies and misdemeanorsat least
in terms of post-conviction consequenceshas been dulled.44
C. Collateral Consequences and Prosecutors
Although scholars have primarily focused on how collateral
consequences impact defendants and defense attorneys,45 these con-
sequences can also play an important role in how prosecutors charge
(and later negotiate) a case. Indeed, the National Prosecution
Standards promulgated by the National District Attorneys Associa-
tion,46 the United States Attorneys Manual,47 and the American
the history of the scope of collateral consequences); Roberts, supra note 27, at 673-74 (The
number and severity of collateral consequences, including increasing bars to employment and
housing, have greatly expanded in recent years. Many of these consequences now apply to
relatively minor criminal convictions, and even to certain noncriminal convictions.) (footnote
omitted).
The recent upsurge in misdemeanor convictions triggering collateral consequences is
merely one part of an overall explosion of collateral consequences over the last three decades.
See Roberts, supra note 27, at 701. Extensive literature details how and why legislatures
increasingly adopted collateral consequences beginning in the late 1980s. See, e.g., JEREMY
TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY 66-68
(2005); Kevin G. Buckler & Lawrence F. Travis III, Reanalyzing the Prevalence and Social
Context of Collateral Consequence Statutes, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 435, 451 (2003); Demleitner,
supra note 43, at 154-55; Pinard, supra note 4, at 1217-19.
44. See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 292 (2011) ([H]owever a particular crime
is labeled, the collateral consequences of misdemeanor convictions render less significant the
line between feloniesat least low-level onesand misdemeanors.).
45. For the effect collateral consequences have on defendants, see generally INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT, supra note 27; TRAVIS, supra note 43; Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs,
and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253
(2002); Demleitner, supra note 43; Pinard, supra note 27; Michael Pinard, Collateral Con-
sequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
457 (2010). And for the effect collateral consequences have on defense attorneys, see supra
note 26.
46. See NATL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, §§ 4-1.3, 4-2.4 (NATL DIST. ATTORNEYS ASSN
2009), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20Commen
tary.pdf [https://perma.cc/HNX6-WAJR]; see also Chin & Holmes, supra note 10, at 720 &
n.202.
47. See U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE [DOJ], UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS MANUAL §§ 9-27.230,
9-27.240, 9-27.250 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-
prosecution [https://perma.cc/XB9H-RN5X]. Interestingly, the Manuals most extensive
discussion of collateral consequences is found in the section titled Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations. Id. § 9-28.1000.
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Bar Associations Criminal Justice Standards48 all recommend that
prosecutors consider potential collateral consequences when mak-
ing initial charging decisions.49
To be sure, prosecutors will not always know every potential
collateral consequence facing a defendant when deciding what
charges, if any, to file in a given case.50 But they will know many of
them, including several of the most severe ones. This is especially
true for those collateral consequences that are automatically trig-
gered by a conviction for a particular offense, and therefore do not
vary according to the individual characteristics of the defendant.51
For example, a prosecutor will or should know ... which sex offenses
lead to registration so that this can be taken into account in the
charging decision.52
For purposes of deciding what charges to file, prosecutors care
about some consequences more than others. For example, prose-
cutors will be most interested in imposing collateral consequences
that further the varied purposes of criminal prosecution, such as
deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, or incapacitation (or some
combination thereof).53 In particular, prosecutors are often animat-
ed by a desire to reduce threats to public safety.54 Collateral con-
sequences that advance that goal are therefore likely to be penalties
of particular interest to prosecutors.55
48. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNC-
TION § 3-3.9(b) (AM. BAR ASSN 1993).
49. See LOVE ET AL., supra note 26, § 8:3; Chin & Holmes, supra note 10, at 720-21; see
also Robert M.A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, 16 CRIM. JUST. 32, 33 (2001) (advising all
prosecutors to comprehend this full range of consequences that flow from a crucial convic-
tion).
50. See LOVE ET AL., supra note 26, § 8:3.
51. See id. (There are some cases where a prosecutor will or should know about potential
collateral consequences even before filing formal charges.); Robert M.A. Johnson, A Prose-
cutors Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 133 (2011).
52. LOVE ET AL., supra note 26, § 8:3.
53. See DOJ, supra note 47, § 9-27.300 (identifying the purposes of criminal law as
punishment, protection of the public, specific and general deterrence, and rehabilitation).
54. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 51, at 131 (explaining that the primary objectives of
sentencing are protecting the public from future crime by the offender and punishing the
offender). 
55. Prosecutors are typically less concerned with other types of collateral consequences,
such as voter disenfranchisement or disqualification from juror service. As one former pro-
secutor I interviewed explained, I never thought about voting [rights] when making charging
decisions. Telephone Interview with Individual G, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015)
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Beginning in the 1990s, legislatures greatly expanded the number
and availability of collateral consequences that seek to curtail fu-
ture risks to public safety.56 Three prominent examples are sex
offender registration, firearm prohibitions, and deportation.57 Each
is aimed, at least in part, at reducing threats to public safety.58 And,
critically, each is now triggered not only by certain felony convic-
tions but also by a variety of misdemeanor offenses.59
1. SexOffender Registration
In 1986, four states had laws requiring certain sex offenders to
register with law enforcement.60 Twelve years later, all fifty states
and the District of Columbia had enacted legislation requiring that
convicted sex offenders register with the police upon release from
[hereinafter Interview with G]. For more details about my interviews with current and former
prosecutors, see infra note 118. The point, of course, is not that such consequences are trivial
(they are not), but rather that, from the prosecutors perspective, they rarely move the
charging needle one way or the other.
56. For example, one quantitative study published in 2003 found a sharp rise in [leg-
islatures] use of firearm restrictions, sex offender registration statutes, and the termination
of parental rights. Buckler & Travis, supra note 43, at 451; see also Demleitner, supra note
43, at 155.
57. These are not the only collateral consequences aimed at minimizing future threats to
public safety. Additional examples include the termination or limitation of a defendants
parental rights and involuntary civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. For a dis-
cussion of the latter, see, for example, Roberts, supra note 27, at 703-09 (noting that the first
statute authorizing the civil commitment of persons deemed sexually violent predators was
passed in 1990 and that now the federal government, twenty states, and the District of
Columbia permit involuntary commitment on such grounds).
58. For an analysis of whether sex offender registration laws actually promote public
safety, see generally Amanda Y. Agan, SexOffender Registries: Fear Without Function?, 54
J.L. & ECON. 207 (2011) (questioning the effectiveness of sex offender registries). For a
discussion of whether the federal firearms ban for misdemeanor domestic violence has suc-
cessfully incapacitated domestic abusers, see Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in
Congresss Shadow, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1411, 1459-60 (2005). And for a thoughtful exam-
ination of the public safety rationale commonly offered as a justification for conviction-based
deportation, see generally Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment:
Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890 (2000).
59. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to Lawyers,
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1299 (2013) ([S]ome misdemeanors carry grave, nearly au-
tomatic collateral consequences such as deportation [and] sex-offender confinement or
registration.).
60. TRAVIS, supra note 43, at 67; Buckler & Travis, supra note 43, at 443.
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prison.61 The obligation to register as a sex offender typically ap-
plies automatically upon conviction of a registerable offense, as
defined by the pertinent jurisdiction.62 Today, the vast majority of
jurisdictions include some misdemeanors in their lists of register-
able offenses.63 Registration periods range from fifteen years to life,
depending on the jurisdiction and qualifying offense.64
2. Firearm Prohibitions
Congress first forbade the possession of firearms by certain crim-
inal offenders in 1938,65 and eventually prohibited all felons from
possessing a firearm in 1968.66 It did not limit the ability of mis-
demeanants to possess firearms, however, until 1996.67 Congress
made it unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any
court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to purchase or
possess a firearm that has travelled in interstate commerce.68 In
addition to the federal ban, fifteen states and the District of
Columbia currently prohibit the possession of firearms by persons
convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence offenses.69 Firearm
61. TRAVIS, supra note 43, at 68; see Buckler & Travis, supra note 43, at 443.
62. For a helpful summary of the numerous and onerous obligations currently imposed
on sex offenders, as well as expanded community notification schemes, see Carpenter &
Beverlin, supra note 7, at 1087-95.
63. See King, supra note 26, at 28; Roberts, supra note 44, at 298-99; see also, e.g., N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW § 168-a (McKinney 2011) (listing five misdemeanors as registerable offenses).
64. See, e.g., Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 7, at 1087 (Today, a tier I offender [the
least serious offender] generally must register for a minimum of fifteen years or, often, twenty
years. Additionally, many more crimes today have been assigned lifetime registration or re-
cast to require lifetime registration.) (footnotes omitted).
65. Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938); Kahn, supra note 8,
at 113.
66. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197;
Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213; see also C. Kevin Marshall, Why
Cant Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 695, 698 (2009).
67. See Mikos, supra note 58, at 1457 & n.153 (discussing Congresss desire to prevent gun
possession by misdemeanor domestic violence offenders).
68. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat.
3009, 3009-371 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)); see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2012)
(defining a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to include state and federal misde-
meanor offenses).
69. See Domestic Violence & Firearms Policy Summary, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIO-
LENCE (May 11, 2014), http://smartgunlaws.org/domestic-violence-firearms-policy-summary/
[https://perma.cc/W2UH-ADHH].
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prohibitions typically apply automatically and immediately upon
conviction of a qualifying offense.
3. Deportation70
The laws governing deportation were largely overhauled in the
1990s.71 Among other things, Congress increased the number of
crimes triggering deportation.72 Most relevant here, Congress signi-
ficantly expanded the number of misdemeanor offenses that render
a noncitizen deportable.73 For example, Congress made a conviction
for any offense relating to a controlled substancesubject to one
narrow exception involving minor marijuana possessionautomatic
grounds for deportation.74 Congress likewise made a wide swath of
The existence of federal and state firearms bans highlights another notable feature of
collateral consequences: they can be imposed by more than one sovereign. Although a convic-
tions direct consequences invariably are levied by the same jurisdiction that prosecuted the
offense, a convictions collateral consequences are not so limited. For example, a state court
conviction may yield both state and federal collateral consequences. This dynamic permits
prosecutors to leverage collateral consequences that are imposed by separate sovereigns.
70. The Court in Padilla observed that deportation is uniquely difficult to classify as
either a direct or a collateral consequence. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010). In
my view, however, deportation is still best understood to be a collateral consequence for at
least two reasons. First, the great weight of authority preceding Padilla consistently classified
deportation as a collateral consequence, see, e.g., Roberts, Ignorance, supra note 26, at 132,
and Padilla expressly avoided upsetting that nearly uniform precedent. Second, the Supreme
Courts reticence to classify deportation as a collateral consequence appeared to dissipate in
its subsequent decision in Chaidez v. United States, in which it described deportation as a
collateral consequence on multiple occasions. See 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1108 (2013). In any event,
my central claim does not hinge on whether deportation is in fact classified as a collateral or
direct consequence, because it is not accounted for when determining which set of adjudi-
catory procedures are required in a given case.
71. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat.
4978, 5050. Congress first made certain criminal convictions a basis for deportation in 1917.
See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361 (describing the enactment of The Immigration Act of 1917).
72. Mikos, supra note 58, at 1444 n.93; see also Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1722-25 (2009).
73. See Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1758-63 (2013); Clapman, supra note 26, at 591; Stephen Lee, De Facto
Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 560-61 (2013). Congress also eliminated most
statutory forms of relief and abolished a sentencing courts ability to prevent deportation
through a procedure known as a judicial recommendation against deportation. Padilla, 559
U.S. at 361-64; see also Mikos, supra note 58, at 1444 n.93.
74. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012); see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368; Cade, supra
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offenses involving domestic violence and child abuse grounds for
deportation.75 In short, a large number of misdemeanorsa cate-
gory of crimes where those convicted often serve no jail timecan
lead to removal.76 And they often do.77
D. Collateral Consequences and Low-Level Prosecutions
To the extent that the current scholarly literature discusses the
impact collateral consequences have on prosecutors, it tends to fo-
cus on the exceptional case. Commentators often highlight instances
in which the prosecutor believes the imposition of a particular
consequence is unwarranted, and the prosecutor is then forced to
engage in various charging machinations in order to avoid trigger-
ing that consequence.78
But that is not the typical case.79 More commonly, the prosecutor
thinks the consequence is not only justified but also important.
Indeed, for cases involving only low-grade felonies or misdemeanors,
securing one of the aforementioned collateral consequences will
note 73, at 1760.
75. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
76. Lee, supra note 73, at 561.
77. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 9, at 14; Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More
Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/7P8M-PDVS]. The Obama Administrations recent actions regarding im-
migration enforcement continues to prioritize the removal of persons convicted of crimes,
including several classes of defendants convicted only of misdemeanor offenses. See Mem-
orandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secy, U.S. Dept of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S.
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft, et al., Policies for the Appre-
hension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.
dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L5JQ-U9JA]
78. The literature is replete with such anecdotes and hypotheticals. See, e.g., Catherine
A. Christian, Awareness of Collateral Consequences: The Role of the Prosecutor, 30 N.Y.U.REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 621, 622 (2006); Smyth, supra note 26, at 494-96; see also LOVE ET AL.,
supra note 26, §§ 8:3, 8:7. These types of charging decisions are especially pronounced in
discussions involving deportation. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 73, at 579.
79. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 9, at 29-32 (reporting that fewer than 5 percent of the
line prosecutors in Kings County, New York (Brooklyn) surveyed responded that they often
or always alter a plea offer because of the potential immigration consequences faced by the
defendant, but approximately 45 percent responded that they rarely or never did); Ingrid
V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1187 (2013) (finding that immigration consequences are [often] an ex-
press prosecutorial goal of the conviction in Maricopa County, Arizona).
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likely be a keyif not the keyprosecutorial objective. This is true
for several reasons.
First, the collateral consequence almost always lasts longer than
the defendants term of incarceration, which for low-level offenders
is usually short or nonexistent.80 For example, the obligation to reg-
ister as a sex offender lasts for a minimum of fifteen years and often
for life.81 The federal prohibition on firearm possession is a lifetime
ban.82 Similarly, deportation amounts to a permanent exclusion
from the United States. As a result, a prosecutor may view a col-
lateral consequence of conviction as her most potent and enduring
weapon against future public safety risks.83
Second, collateral consequences often expose the defendant to a
lengthy incarceration term if he violates the pertinent prohibition,
thereby bolstering the consequences specific deterrent effect. For
example, if a defendant fails to register properly as a sex offender,
he can be charged with a criminal offense punishable by more than
a decade in prison.84 Similarly, an offender found in unlawful
custody of a firearm may be sentenced up to ten years in prison.85
And a deported person who unlawfully reenters the country can be
prosecuted and imprisoned for that reentry.86 For each of these
offenses, establishing a violation is usually straightforward and
typically much easier to prove than the underlying offense that
triggered the collateral consequence.87
80. Most felony convictions result in little or no actual jail time. See Bowers, supra note
18, at 1145 n.139; Chin, supra note 4, at 153-54. And very few misdemeanor defendants spend
any time in jail. See Chin, supra note 4, at 153-54, 154 n.22 (observing that, between 2006 and
2010, approximately 20 percent of persons arrested in New York on misdemeanor charges
were ultimately sentenced to prison or jail).
81. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 43, at 154 ([F]or many convicted offenders ... these
collateral consequences are ... the most persistent punishments that are inflicted for [their]
crime. (quoting Velmer S. Burton, Jr., et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Con-
viction: A National Study of State Statutes, FED. PROB., Sept. 1987, at 52)); Roberts, supra
note 27, at 674 ([C]ollateral consequences often far outweigh the direct penal sanction of a
conviction.).
84. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2012).
85. See id. § 924(a).
86. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
87. Notice how much lighter the governments burden will be in these subsequent cases:
Did the defendant fail to register properly? Not did the defendant commit a sex offense. Was
the defendant found in possession of a firearm? Not did the defendant commit an act of
2016] CHARGING ON THE MARGIN 795
Third, many collateral consequencesincluding two of the three
highlighted hererepresent a guaranteed penalty upon conviction.
In other words, these collateral consequences cannot be circum-
vented by a sentencing judge, which is significant for prosecutors
concerned about controlling the penalties imposed on a defendant.88
For example, if convicted of a qualifying offense, a defendant will be
required to register as a sex offender. Firearm prohibitions work
this way, too. Although deportation is not formally guaranteed, a
defendant rendered eligible for deportation likely will be removed
if he is later detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement.89
In sum, prosecutors will often be attuned to certain collateral
consequences that further the goals of criminal prosecution, espe-
cially those aimed at reducing threats to public safety. When it
comes to low-level offenses, those collateral consequences are often
the most important goal of a criminal prosecution.90
II. STRATEGIC UNDERCHARGING: WHY LESS IS SOMETIMES MORE
As detailed in Part I, several collateral consequences of consider-
able interest to prosecutors are now triggered by misdemeanor
convictions. This has meaningfully expanded a prosecutors charging
domestic violence. Was the defendant found in the country after being removed? Not did the
defendant commit the deportable offense.
In addition, the subsequent violations are easier to prove because they typically turn on law
enforcement witnesses, not lay witnesses. Compared to police witnesses, lay witnesses are
less reliable, easier to impeach, and less certain to cooperate with pretrial investigation and
trial preparation or even to appear and testify in the event of trial. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt,
Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655,
1713 (2010).
88. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 49 at 33 (These collateral consequences are simply a
new form of mandated sentences. Prosecutors have often favored mandated sentences to
counter the tendencies of some judges who seem incapable of giving serious consequences for
serious crimes.). In this respect, mandatory collateral consequences operate like mandatory
minimum prison sentences, which enhance the prosecutors relative power as she controls the
penalty through her charging discretion. See Demleitner, supra note 43, at 161; William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Laws Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548,
2562 (2004).
89. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363-64 (2010) (observing that deportation is
practically inevitable in most cases after a defendant who was convicted of a removable of-
fense has been detained).
90. See UNIF. ACT, supra note 10, Prefatory Note at 4; Pinard, supra note 27, at 684
(recognizing the centrality of collateral consequences to the criminal process).
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options. For cases in which imposition of the collateral consequence
is a crucial prosecutorial aim, an inability to obtain that conse-
quence through a misdemeanor conviction would effectively force
the prosecutor to bring a felony case. The recent attachment of
severe collateral consequences to misdemeanor offenses therefore
unlocks an array of additional charging options for prosecutors keen
on imposing such consequences.
But do prosecutors actually exercise that newfound charging
option? In this Part, I explain that there are several reasons why a
prosecutor might choose to file a misdemeanor charge instead of a
felony chargethat is, why she might engage in strategic under-
chargingwhen a critical collateral consequence is triggered by a
misdemeanor conviction. To be clear, I do not claim that prosecutors
will choose the misdemeanor option in every case. Rather, my claim
is that we should expect prosecutors to file a misdemeanor charge
in a significant number of cases and far more often than the con-
ventional wisdom suggests.91
The key point is that an offenses collateral consequences, no
matter how severe, are generally deemed irrelevant for determining
what procedural safeguards apply. In other words, a misdemeanor
that threatens a severe collateral consequence is classified the same
as any other misdemeanor in a jurisdictions criminal justice sys-
tem.
Because misdemeanors are less costly and time-consuming to
prosecute than felonies, filing a misdemeanor furthers prosecutorial
desires for efficiency.92 In some cases, the likelihood of conviction is
also increased by filing a misdemeanor, and it is generally no less
than if a felony were charged.93 Finally, although prosecutors pur-
suing a misdemeanor case must surrender the prospect of additional
incarceration, the degree of that sacrifice is typically much smaller
than one might expect and often not enough to offset the substantial
benefits associated with increased efficiency and a higher likelihood
of conviction.94
91. Cf. Meares, supra note 23, at 868-69 (stating that [o]vercharging is systemic and that
prosecutors may often believe that it is in [their] best interests to charge the defendant with
the most serious and as many crimes at the outset of the case). 
92. See infra Part II.B.
93. See infra Part II.C.
94. See infra Part II.D.
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A. The Choice
Before examining how prosecutors exercise their charging discre-
tion, it is important to understand who is responsible for the initial
charging decision and the lasting impact that decision typically has
on a case.
One common practice, especially in larger offices, is to designate
a group of prosecutors as having primary responsibility for screen-
ing incoming cases and making charging decisions.95 These prosecu-
tors tend to be relatively senior and most of their time is dedicated
to handling the influx of new cases.96 After the charging decision is
made by the screening attorney, the case is then assigned to the
pertinent line prosecutor.
Another common practice is for line prosecutors to screen cases
on a rotating basis and, if charges are filed, continue to prosecute
many of those same cases.97 For those prosecutors, the process of
screening cases is one way new matters are added to their case-
load.98 But those prosecutors do not necessarily keep every case they
screen, even if charges are filed. Line attorneys who moonlight as
screeners often handle only felony matters. Therefore, if the new
matter involves only misdemeanor charges, the case may be assign-
ed to a prosecutor in that offices misdemeanor division.
95. The screening attorneys studied by Ronald Wright and Marc Miller in their exam-
ination of the New Orleans District Attorneys Office generally fit this mold. See Ronald
Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002). As
Wright and Miller detail, the New Orleans District Attorneys Office has a dedicated
Screening Section, in which about fifteen of the eighty-five attorneys in the office work at
any given time. See id. at 62-63. In New Orleans, the screening attorney exercises significant
authority and discretion on behalf of the office: The screener reviews the investigation file,
speaks to all the key witnesses and the victims (often by telephone, but sometimes in person),
and generally gauges the strength of the case. Id. at 63. For the most serious crimes,
Wright and Miller report, the office conducts charge conferences with senior prosecutors
and police present to discuss the facts and potential charges. Id. at 64. But aside from those
cases, which typically involve homicide and rape, the screening attorney makes the charging
decision for the office. Id. at 63-64.
96. See id. at 63 (noting that all screening attorneys in the New Orleans District
Attorneys Office served previously (usually a couple of years) in the Trial Section).
97. See id. at 104 n.290 (In some systems, the same attorney screens and tries (or
negotiates) the case.); see also Telephone Interview with Individual K, Current Prosecutor
(July 8, 2015) [hereinafter Interview with K] (describing such a practice in a large Midwestern
county prosecutors office).
98. See Interview with K, supra note 97.
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Of course, the neat division outlined here oversimplifies matters
to some degree. Some offices have both groups, whereas others
follow a different model altogether. The main point is that the
incentives of the prosecutor making the initial charging decision
may vary depending on whether she is a dedicated screener or a line
attorney doubling as a screener.
Prosecutors enjoy tremendous discretion when deciding what
criminal charges, if any, to pursue in a given case.99 As one leading
scholar put it, [n]o government official in America has as much
unreviewable power and discretion as the prosecutor.100 The
Supreme Court has placed few limits on how prosecutors exercise
their charging discretion, concluding that a prosecutors decision to
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.101
The primary constraint is that the prosecutor must have proba-
ble cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined
by [the applicable] statute.102 Probable cause, however, is not a
particularly demanding standard. The Court has also imposed two
other limitationsprohibitions on selective prosecution103 and
vindictive prosecution104but neither is particularly confining. In
99. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (In our criminal justice system,
the Government retains broad discretion as to whom to prosecute.).
100. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2009); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration:
Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 272 (2013) ([Prosecutors]
have almost unlimited and unreviewable power to select the charges that will be brought
against defendants.); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243,
1243-44 (2011).
101. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
102. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). For an interesting discussion about
the Supreme Courts missed opportunity in Bordenkircher, see William J. Stuntz, The
Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 840-42 (2006).
103. A prosecutor engages in selective prosecution when her decision to prosecute is de-
liberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 (citing Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364 (quoting Oyler
v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))). However, proving such a violation is extremely difficult.
Selective prosecution claims are judged according to ordinary equal protection standards,
which means that the defendant must establish that he was treated differently from others
and that the prosecutors decision was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Id.; see also
Pamela Cothran, Prosecutorial Discretion, 82 GEO. L.J. 771, 774 (1994) (A prosecutors
decision to bring charges rarely violates the Equal Protection Clause.).
104. The Supreme Court has narrowly defined what conduct qualifies as unconstitutionally
vindictive. In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the
government could not retaliate against a defendant for invoking his right to appeal a
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short, prosecutors are generally free to exercise their charging dis-
cretion, and the awesome power such discretion entails, however
they please.105
Given todays extensive criminal codes, prosecutors will typically
have multiple options when choosing how to charge a particular
course of conduct.106 This Article focuses on a prosecutors decision
to file a felony charge or misdemeanor charge. That choice is par-
ticularly important. Among other things, this initial decision has a
lasting impact: cases usually finish on the same side of the felony-
misdemeanor line as where they began.107
As Ronald Wright and Rodney Engen detailed in their studies of
North Carolina felony prosecutions, prosecutors and defense attor-
neys in felony cases treat the felony-misdemeanor line as a major
hurdle to cross.108 According to Wright and Engen, only 25 percent
of cases initially charged as felonies end in a misdemeanor convic-
tion.109 The felony-misdemeanor hurdle is especially high when the
conviction by substituting a more serious charge for the original one upon remand from the
appellate court. Critically, the Court has carefully distinguished post-appeal retaliation from
a pretrial decision to modify the charges against the defendant. United States v. Goodwin,
457 U.S. 368, 380 (1982). Specifically, the Court has expressly held that a prosecutor may file
additional charges [before trial] if an initial expectation that a defendant would plead guilty
to lesser charges proves unfounded. Id. As a result, vindictive prosecution claims are
effectively limited to instances of post-trial retaliation. See id. at 381-82.
105. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 794 (1977).
106. See Stuntz, supra note 88, at 2549.
107. See Telephone Interview with Individual A, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015)
[hereinafter Interview with A]. There are likely several reasons for these phenomena. Among
other things, misdemeanor cases and felony cases are often handled by different sets of
prosecutors and processed by entirely different trial courts. See infra notes 224-28 and
accompanying text. In other words, institutional inertia probably plays a role. With respect
to cases that start as felony prosecutions, prosecutors likely do not make a habit of reducing
felony cases to misdemeanors because of concerns related to the setting of plea market prices.
If felonies were routinely reduced to misdemeanors, then that would become the expectation
of future defendants charged with felonies (or, more precisely, their attorneys), thereby
weakening a prosecutors standard bargaining position. With respect to cases that start as
misdemeanor prosecutions, increasing the charges to a felony would often require satisfying
additional procedural requirementssuch as approval by a grand jury. In addition,
misdemeanor prosecutors would probably need to obtain supervisor approval to bump the case
up to a felony. See Telephone Interview with Individual D, Current Prosecutor (June 8, 2015)
[hereinafter Interview with D]. Both considerations likely have a chilling effect on prosecutors
contemplating turning a misdemeanor charge into a felony one.
108. Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of Prosecutors,
91 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 10 (2007).
109. Id. at 26-27.
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jurisdictions criminal code contains multiple felony grade options
for the same core offense.110 In these areas of greatest depth,
Wright and Engen observed, the criminal code is structured to
make prosecutors especially reluctant to cross the felony-misde-
meanor line.111 They found that when there were three or more
felony grade options for an offense, a mere 12 percent of felony cases
ended with a misdemeanor conviction only.112 Similarly, cases that
begin as misdemeanor prosecutions rarely turn into felonies.113
B. Efficiency Gains
The strongest incentive prosecutors have for pursuing a case as
a misdemeanor rather than a felony is that misdemeanors are typ-
ically much less costly to prosecute.114 Prosecutors and their offices
have two obvious reasons for wanting to resolve cases as efficiently
as possible.115 First, efficient resolution free[s] up prosecutors to
110. See generally Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance
in a Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935
(2006).
111. Wright & Engen, supra note 108, at 27-28.
112. Id. at 25.
113. As Issa Kohler-Hausmann documented in her discerning study of New York City, only
0.2 percent of cases in that jurisdiction that had a top arrest charge of a misdemeanor ended
in a felony disposition. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misde-
meanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 651 n.108 (2014) (about 450 out of more than 226,000
dispositions). Kohler-Hausmanns data is keyed off cases in which the top arrest charge was
a misdemeanor, rather than those in which the top initial charge by the prosecution was a
misdemeanor. See id. at 630. But there is little reason to think that the latter would
meaningfully differ from the former. Indeed, several prosecutors I interviewed confirmed it
was rare for a case initially filed as a misdemeanor to finish as a felony. See, e.g., Telephone
Interview with Individual I, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015) [hereinafter Interview with I];
Interview with K, supra note 97 (describing a Midwestern urban jurisdiction).
114. See, e.g., Interview with A, supra note 107 (explaining that felony prosecutions are
more time-intensive and resource-intensive than misdemeanor cases); Interview with G,
supra note 55.
115. Although prosecutors are surely influenced by concerns about efficiency, I do not mean
to suggest that is their only source of motivation. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying
text; infra notes 164-71, 204-07 and accompanying text (identifying conviction rates, potential
penalties, and public safety as additional factors). Indeed, a definitive and comprehensive
answer to what prosecutors prioritize has proven elusive. See Stuntz, supra note 88, at 2554
n.6 (There is as yet no developed social science literature on what prosecutors maximize,
probably because the solution is too complex to model effectively.); Wright & Levine, supra
note 20, at 1067 (Unfortunately, even though we understand much about what prosecutors
do, we know remarkably little about why they do it.). The point is simply that efficiency is
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pursue many more cases, thereby serving the general mission of
the office.116 Second, all prosecutorsbut especially those managing
bloated caseloadshave personal incentives to reduce their work-
loads.117
It is therefore unsurprising that several prosecutors I interview-
ed118 acknowledged that concerns about resource constraints often
play an important role in charging decisions.119 For example, a sen-
sitivity to resource constraints is one reason why screeners in some
prosecutors offices are required to seek supervisory approval before
one of several important considerations.
116. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2471 (2004).
117. Id.; see also Bowers, supra note 18, at 1122, 1140-41 (explaining that prosecutors are
interested in reducing their own administrative costs and avoid[ing] process and work,
where possible).
Notice that if the prosecutor making the initial charging decision is a line attorney moon-
lighting as a screener, she may have additional incentive to charge a borderline case as a
misdemeanorand thereby shift future responsibility for the case to a separate prosecutor
in the office rather than adding another felony case to her own caseload. This is especially
likely for cases in which the evidence appears to be relatively weak (and therefore less likely
to plead quickly) or if the case appears to require disproportionate time and attention. See
Interview with K, supra note 97 (describing such decisions).
118. I conducted semistructured interviews with eleven current or former prosecutors. See
generally Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 881 n.103 (2014)
(describing semistructured interview technique and citing examples of its use in law review
literature). In exchange for their candor, I agreed to keep the interviewees identities confi-
dential and their responses anonymous. The interviews were conducted over the phone, and
each typically lasted about one hour.
To be clear, these interviews do not purport to represent a comprehensive qualitative study.
They nonetheless provide an instructive window into the practices followed by a variety of
prosecutors offices. The group of interviewees included prosecutors that had served in federal
and state court (and sometimes both); collectively, they had worked as prosecutors in twelve
different offices around the country. Eight of the interviewees were male and three were
female. Their average tenure as a prosecutor was 6.5 years, with length of service ranging
from 1 year to 11 years.
119. When asked what factors prosecutors in their respective offices typically considered
when deciding what charges to file in a given case, the prosecutors I interviewed repeatedly
highlighted resource constraints as one of three principal considerations. See, e.g., Telephone
Interview with Individual F, Current Prosecutor (June 6, 2015) (admitting surprise when
first serving as a prosecutor about how much resource constraints and time constraints
matter during charging decisions and plea negotiations); see also Interview with A,
supra note 107; Interview with D, supra note 107; Telephone Interview with Individual E,
Current Prosecutor (June 5, 2015) [hereinafter Interview with E]; Interview with G, supra
note 55; Interview with K, supra note 97. The other two principal factors cited by the
prosecutors I interviewed were strength of the evidence and the defendants criminal history.
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filing a felony charge, but they are not required to obtain such
approval before filing a misdemeanor charge.120
Misdemeanors are typically less costly and less time-consuming
to prosecute because felony defendants possess a unique bundle of
procedural guarantees.121 Critically, those procedural entitlements
do not extend to misdemeanor defendants charged with offenses
that trigger serious collateral consequences. As a result, prosecutors
can pursue a severe collateral consequence by filing a misdemeanor
without triggering the costly procedural safeguards associated with
felony prosecutions.
1. Initial Felony Costs: Grand Juries and Preliminary Hearings
A key difference between felony and misdemeanor cases is the
costs prosecutors must shoulder ... immediately in felony cases,
but not in misdemeanor ones.122 At the outset of felony cases, prose-
cutors typically must present witnesses and evidence to establish
probable cause to grand juries or to judges at preliminary hear-
ings.123 Prosecutors have no such obligation in misdemeanor cases,
even when a severe collateral consequence is at stake.124
120. See, e.g., Interview with D, supra note 107.
121. See 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 1.8(c) (Every jurisdiction provides for some
procedural differences based upon a distinction between major and minor crimes.); Natapoff,
supra note 13, at 1315-17. Of course, some criminal procedure entitlements do apply across
the board, regardless of an offenses relative severity. For example, in all cases the
government must establish each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). And several trial rights, such as those guaranteed by the
Confrontation Clause, apply to all criminal prosecutionsno matter how minor. See Sanjay
Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 520 (2009).
122. Bowers, supra note 87, at 1713.
123. Id.
124. Id.
2016] CHARGING ON THE MARGIN 803
The federal government125 and eighteen states126 provide criminal
defendants the right to have felony chargesbut only felony charg-
esinitiated by a grand jury. The remaining states provide prose-
cutors the option of initiating felony charges either by filing an
information or by seeking an indictment from a grand jury.127 In
these jurisdictions, prosecutors overwhelmingly prefer the informa-
tion optionindicating that, when given the choice, prosecutors
tend to avoid the more burdensome grand jury process.128 In all
jurisdictions, prosecutors may initiate misdemeanor cases without
proceeding before a grand jury.
To be sure, there are many instances when a prosecutor will
happilyeven thankfullyinvoke the powers of the grand jury for
investigatory purposes. But for many more cases, the grand jury
requirement is just an additional cost of doing felony business. Even
in jurisdictions where grand juries rarely decline to indict, the grand
jury requirement still imposes meaningful costs on the prosecutors
office, including the costs related to prosecutor time and grand jury
time. Even if one accepts the familiar adage that a prosecutor could
get a grand jury to indict a ham sandwich, it is nevertheless the
125. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 tracks the require-
ments of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that, subject to limited exceptions, [n]o
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a Grand Jury. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court has long
interpreted infamous crime as one that authorizes an infamous punishment. See, e.g., Ex
parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426 (1885). The Supreme Court has further held that infamous
punishments include imprisonment in a penitentiary or imprisonment for any period of time
at hard labor. See United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922). Because federal law has
traditionally limited imprisonment in a penitentiary to offenders sentenced to incarceration
for more than one year, only persons convicted of a felony under federal law could potentially
be sentenced to a penitentiary. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 15.1(b); see also 18
U.S.C. § 4083 (2012).
126. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 15.1(d). Although there is some variance in how
each state defines the category of offenses requiring indictment by a grand jury, the effective
rule for those eighteen states and D.C. is that indictments are necessary only for felony
offenses (that is, those offenses in which potential imprisonment exceeds one year). See id.
(explaining the various ways in which those jurisdictions have defined the category of offenses
for which a defendant is entitled to a grand jury).
127. See id. § 15.1(g). Because the Fifth Amendments Grand Jury Clause, U.S. CONST.
amend. V, cl. 1, has not been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, state criminal defendants have no federal constitutional right to a grand jury. See
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1884). It is accordingly up to each state whether
to require a grand jury for certain criminal prosecutions.
128. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 15.1(g).
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case that a prosecutor would often prefer to charge that ham sand-
wich by information rather than indictment. And if an office has
thousands of ham sandwiches to process, the more that can be
charged by information the better.
Where felony cases can be initiated by information instead of
indictment, prosecutors must still bear the cost of a preliminary
hearing.129 A preliminary hearing is an adversarial proceeding
conducted by a judicial officer relatively early in the adjudicatory
process that inquires whether there is probable cause to believe the
defendant committed the relevant offense.130 The government
typically needs to establish probable cause in order for the case to
proceed any further.131 In addition to serving as an initial screening
mechanism,132 preliminary hearings often provide valuable informa-
tion about the prosecutions case to the defense team at a relatively
early stage in the life of a case.133 However, like the right to a grand
jury, the right to a preliminary hearing is typically reserved only for
felony defendants.134
Critically, no jurisdiction appears to consider an offenses poten-
tial collateral consequences when determining whether a defendant
has a right to a grand jury or a preliminary hearing. As a result, the
fact that a misdemeanor may carry a severe collateral consequence
does not trigger the initial procedural costs associated with felony
prosecutions.
129. In those jurisdictions that require felonies to be initiated by a grand jury, or permit
prosecutors to choose between information and indictment, preliminary hearings are typically
rendered unnecessary once the grand jury has returned an indictment. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
5.1(a)(2); 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 14.2(c)-(d).
130. 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 14.1(a).
131. Id.
132. See Interview with K, supra note 97 (identifying preliminary hearings as one of the
reasons felonies are more burdensome to prosecute, in part because they are one more
evidentiary hearing a prosecutor has to do).
133. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 116, at 2494-95 ([I]n some states, preliminary hearings
reveal much of the prosecutions evidence to defense lawyers in time for bargaining.). 
134. See William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth
Amendment Equations Warrantless Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin,
38 KAN. L. REV. 439, 511 n.302 (1990). One exception is Utah, which requires preliminary
hearings for some misdemeanors as well. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 14.2(d), at 307
n.60.
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2. Felony Discovery Costs
Defendants charged with felonies typically receive more ample
discovery than defendants charged with misdemeanors.135 This
usually occurs because of the additional mandatory discovery re-
quirements that the government is typically subject to in felony
cases and the increased mechanisms that defendants have for devel-
oping discovery in felony cases.136 As a result, felony prosecutors are
often forced to endure the additional costs of heightened discovery
obligationscosts which add up quickly for prosecutors managing
swollen caseloads. Additional discovery requirements can also re-
duce some of the governments bargaining power during plea
negotiations, especially if the additional disclosures would force the
prosecutor to lay bare evidentiary weak spotsyet another reason
why borderline cases with evidentiary concerns might get routed to
the misdemeanor track.
The degree to which jurisdictions afford felony defendants more
discovery varies. For example, in the federal system most (though
not all) discovery rules apply equally to defendants facing misde-
meanor charges as those facing felony charges.137 Many state juris-
dictions, however, create significant disparities in how discovery is
handled in felony and misdemeanor cases.
For example, several states that require open file discovery do
so only in cases involving felony offenses. In Arizona, for instance,
only felony defendants are entitled to receive [a]ll then existing
original and supplemental reports prepared by a law enforcement
agency in connection with the particular crime with which the
defendant is charged138 at the outset of the prosecution. Similarly,
in North Carolina, a pioneering state for open file discovery, only
135. See Schroeder, supra note 134, at 511 n.300.
136. See, e.g., 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 1.8(c) (Pretrial discovery is also likely to
be different [for felony and misdemeanor defendants], with such discovery considerably
narrower as to the misdemeanor defendant. Similarly, pretrial procedures for developing
evidence (e.g., depositions) and for sharpening the issues at trial (e.g., the bill of particulars
or pretrial conferences) are likely to be restricted (or simply unavailable) in the process
applicable to minor offenses.) (footnote omitted); id. § 20.2(c).
137. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. But see FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(c)(3) (making distinctions between
felony and misdemeanor offenses for purposes of depositions taken outside the United States).
138. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1.
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felony defendants are entitled to the wealth of materials made
available by such disclosure requirements.139
Some jurisdictions that do not require open file discovery also
make significant distinctions between felony and misdemeanor
offenses. In Georgia, for example, state law provides more expansive
discovery regarding statements made by the defendant to members
of law enforcement in felony prosecutions than in misdemeanor
prosecutions.140 Moreover, Georgia prosecutors in felony cases must
disclose to the defendant more information regarding potential
witnesses and witness statements than is required in misdemeanor
cases.141
Although many jurisdictions create differing discovery obligations
for felony and misdemeanor prosecutions, I am not aware of any
jurisdiction where the discovery rules are altered based on an of-
fenses potential collateral consequences.
3. Potential Future Costs: Right to a Jury Trial
A final set of procedural guarantees that varies across offense
types is a defendants right to demand a jury trial. According to the
Supreme Court, the right to a jury trial provides the defendant an
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecut-
or and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.142 From
the perspective of the prosecutor, however, a jury trial is often un-
welcome.
As an initial matter, jury trials take longer to complete than
bench trials. Jury trials require additional time for jury selection,
jury instructions, and lengthier opening and closing statements.
According to one analysis of federal prosecutions, jury trials on
average took four times longer to complete than bench trials.143 As
139. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-901, 15A-903 (1973).
140. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 17-16-4 (1994), with GA. CODE ANN. § 17-16-22.
141. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 17-16-8(a), and GA. CODE ANN. § 17-16-7, with GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 17-16-20 to 23. Similarly, only in felony prosecutions must the government disclose
before trial any [s]tatements of coconspirators that are attributable to the defendant and
arguably admissible against the defendant at trial. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-16-4(a)(2).
142. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). Blackstone described trial by jury as
the grand bulwark of English liberties. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 246 (1999)
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 342-44).
143. See Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81 NOTRE
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one former prosecutor I interviewed pithily put it: [A] two-hour
bench trial becomes a three-day event with a jury.144
But the costs associated with the trial itself are only part of the
equation. Compared to bench trials, jury trials often require prose-
cutors to engage in more intensive preparation and frequently entail
more pretrial litigation over procedural and evidentiary issues.145
For these reasons, offenses that result in a jury trial are substan-
tially more costly to prosecute than those that end with a bench
trial.146
It is no surprise, therefore, that several studies have documented
prosecutors preference for bench trials instead of jury trials. For
example, Issa Kohler-Hausmann observed that the standard prac-
tice for misdemeanor prosecutors in New York City was, on the eve
of trial, to reduce any Class A misdemeanor charges (which trigger
the right to a jury trial in New York City) to Class B misdemeanor
charges (which do not) in order to ensure a bench trial.147 Put
DAME L. REV. 1495, 1499 n.12 (2006).
144. Interview with G, supra note 55.
145. See Segal & Stein, supra note 143, at 1515 (observing that jury trials involve more
ancillary litigation over procedural and evidentiary issues than bench trials); see also
Interview with G, supra note 55 (explaining that preparation for jury trials is typically more
extensive than preparation for bench trials).
146. Of course, it is true that few cases ultimately reach an actual trialjury or bench. But
when prosecutors are making initial charging decisions, they do not always know in advance
which cases will be the ones that go to trial and which ones will be resolved before trial. This
is particularly true for low-level offenses when the threatened incarceration is rarely exor-
bitant. Furthermore, defendants facing a severe collateral consequence (such as deportation)
may be especially inclined to litigate instead of pleading guilty because they have relatively
little to lose. See Interview with D, supra note 107 (observing that defendants in one large
East Coast jurisdiction typically wont plead to an offense that renders a noncitizen
removable). Thus, prosecutors must charge a case with an eye towards who the ultimate
adjudicator will be in the event the case does eventually go to trial. See id. (explaining that
potential jury appeal is a factor prosecutors typically consider when making initial charging
decisions, especially if there is reason to believe that the case might ultimately go to trial).
147. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 113, at 659 n.133, 662 n.142; see also M. Chris
Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense Clinics in Zero-Tolerance Policing Regimes, 36
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 351, 372 n.106 (2012) (observing the same practice in the
context of misdemeanor trespass prosecutions). Class A misdemeanors authorize up to one
year imprisonment, whereas Class B misdemeanors authorize up to only three months
imprisonment. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15(1)-(2) (McKinney 1965). New York courts have
upheld this practice, primarily on the grounds that [t]he District Attorney has almost
unfettered discretion in determining how and when to prosecute, including the right to
reduce, add or amend charges. People v. Williams, 465 N.Y.S.2d 648, 655-56 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1983); see also People v. Urbaez, 886 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 2008).
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simply, by withholding the jury trial right governments gain a
major strategic advantage, depriving defendants of the option to
threaten exercise of the right, with its associated adverse impact on
dockets and justice system resources.148
Given prosecutors preference to avoid jury trialsand the threat
of jury trialswhen feasible, it is important to understand when a
defendant has a right to a jury trial. Under the Sixth Amendment,
all felony defendants, but only some misdemeanor defendants, have
a federal constitutional right to demand a jury trial. A misdemeanor
defendant charged only with petty offenses has no federal consti-
tutional right to a jury trial.149 The current lodestar for determining
whether an offense is petty is the potential term of imprisonment it
authorizes.150 An offense that threatens more than six months
imprisonment is always considered serious and automatically trig-
gers a defendants right to trial by jury.151 Conversely, an offense
that carries a maximum term of imprisonment of six months or less
is presumed to be petty.152 The presumption is rebutted and the
Such dedication to avoiding a jury trial whenever possible is by no means limited to New
York. See, e.g., Brandon K. Crase, When Doing Justice Isnt Enough: Reinventing the Guide-
lines for Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 475-77 (2007) (explaining a
practice in the District of Columbia where prosecutors invariably charge attempted threats
rather than threatseven if the alleged conduct was a completed threatbecause [only] the
lesser crime of attempted threats does not provide sufficient time of imprisonment to warrant
a jury trial).
148. Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws and
the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 158 (2009).
149. See, e.g., Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989); Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970).
150. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541-42. The Court previously focused on the nature of the
offense and on whether it was triable by a jury at common law. Id. at 541 (citing District of
Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930)); see Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555-57 (1888).
See generally Colleen P. Murphy, The Narrowing of the Entitlement to Criminal Jury Trial,
1997 WIS. L. REV. 133 (tracing the Courts various approaches to the petty offense exception
over time). According to the Court, it shifted its attention to an offenses potential term of
imprisonment because that is a more objective indication[] of the seriousness with which
society regards the offense. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541 (quoting Frank v. United States, 395
U.S. 147, 148 (1969)).
151. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542.
152. See id. at 543. The Supreme Court has also clarified that the critical inquiry is wheth-
er any single offense authorizes a term of imprisonment in excess of six months. In Lewis v.
United States, the Court held that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is prosecuted
for multiple petty offenses, even if the aggregate prison term authorized for the offenses
exceeds six months. 518 U.S. 322, 323 (1996). As a result, a prosecutor that carefully engages
in misdemeanor charge stacking, see infra note 220 and accompanying text, can avoid
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defendant has a right to a jury trial if he can demonstrate that any
additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the
maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they
clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in ques-
tion is a serious one.153 Notably, the Supreme Court has thus far
limited its legislative determination inquiry to the legislature that
enacted the offense.154 This is significant because other sover-
eignssuch as the federal governmentmay impose additional
statutory penalties upon conviction.155
Whereas a number of states follow the federal constitutional
baseline when determining the scope of a defendants right to a jury
trial, many others exceed the constitutional floor and provide more
expansive jury trial rights.156 For example, several states require a
trial by jury for all offenses that authorize any amount of potential
imprisonment.157 And some jurisdictions provide all criminal defend-
ants a right to a jury trial.158
As for the relevance of an offenses collateral consequences, the
Supreme Courts reference to additional statutory penalties in
Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas appears to suggest that at least
some collateral consequences may be pertinent when determining
whether a defendant has a federal constitutional right to a jury
trial.159 However, since Blanton, several significant collateral con-
sequences have been deemed irrelevant by courts when deciding
whether a presumptively petty offense is, in fact, serious for Sixth
Amendment purposes. Federal and state courts have repeatedly
concluded that a requirement to register as a sex offender is im-
triggering a defendants right to a jury trial.
153. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543. In Blanton, the Court predicted that it would be the rare
situation where a legislature packs an offense it deems serious with onerous penalties that
nonetheless do not puncture the 6-month incarceration line. Id. at 543 (citing Brief for
Petitioners at 16); see also United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5 (1993) (repeating the rare
case observation made in Blanton). Notably, the Court made these predictions when
misdemeanor offenses triggered fewer collateral consequences than is the case today.
154. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543-44, 545 n.11.
155. Id. at 543; see supra note 69.
156. See Murphy, supra note 150, at 171-73.
157. See id. at 171-72.
158. See id. at 171.
159. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543. In Blanton, the Court concluded that an automatic
ninety-day license suspension imposed for a DUI conviction did not rebut the presumption of
pettiness. See id. at 543-44.
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material to the calculus.160 This conclusion has primarily rested on
the assertion that sex offender registration is not formally a crim-
inal punishment but rather a remedial, collateral consequence of
the conviction.161 Similarly, state courts have consistently ignored
the deportation consequences of a conviction when deciding whether
an offense is petty or serious.162 And state courts have also held that
a federal firearm bansuch as the one for persons convicted of a
misdemeanor domestic violence offenseis irrelevant because it
was Congress that enacted the firearm prohibition, not the applica-
ble state legislature.163
In sum, as is the case with grand juries, preliminary hearings,
and enhanced discovery obligations, prosecutors can often avoid
160. See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 942 A.2d 1180, 1186 (D.C. 2008); People v.
Danthuluri, 923 N.Y.S.2d 814 (App. Div. 2011); People v. Wrighton, 918 N.Y.S.2d 274 (App.
Div. 2011); People v. Shewbarran, 729 N.Y.S.2d 563 (App. Div. 2001).
161. Wrighton, 918 N.Y.S.2d at 725. Some courts have also refused to consider a require-
ment to register as a sex offender as relevant when determining whether an offense is petty
because the jurisdiction imposing that obligation is different from the one prosecuting the
offense. See, e.g., Ivy v. United States, No. 5:08-CR-00021-TBR, 2010 WL 1257729 (W.D. Ky.
Mar. 26, 2010); Rauch v. United States, No. 1:07-CV-0730 WMW, 2007 WL 2900181 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 28, 2007). Notably, one state supreme court has held as a matter of state law that being
required to register as a sex offender does transform a presumptively petty offense into a se-
rious one, thereby entitling the defendant to a trial by jury. See Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536,
543-44 (Ariz. 2008).
162. See, e.g., Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 319 P.3d 602, 605 (Nev. 2014) (hold-
ing that deportation, which arise[s] out of federal law, is not relevant to the jury trial
inquiry because it does not reflect a determination by the Nevada Legislature that first-
offense domestic battery is a serious offense). Notably, in July 2015, a panel of the D.C. Court
of Appeals concluded that, in light of the Supreme Courts decision in Padilla, a noncitizen
defendant charged with a presumptively petty offense had a constitutional right to a jury trial
if a conviction would render the defendant deportable. See Bado v. United States, 120 A.3d
50 (D.C. 2015). The D.C. Court of Appeals subsequently vacated that decision after granting
the governments petition for rehearing en banc. See Bado v. United States, 125 A.3d 1119
(D.C. 2015) (mem.) (per curiam). At the time of publication, the D.C. Court of Appeals had not
yet issued its en banc decision.
163. See Amezcua, 319 P.3d at 605. Federal courts have generally considered firearm
prohibitions, but most have concluded that they are not sufficiently severe to render an of-
fense serious. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000) (We
hold that the prohibition of firearm possession by persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence is not so serious as to entitle them to a jury trial for a presumptively
petty offense.); United States v. Jardee, No. 4:09-mj-091, 2010 WL 565242 (D.N.D. Feb. 12,
2010); United States v. Combs, No. 8:05CR271, 2005 WL 3262983 (D. Neb. Dec. 1, 2005). But
see United States v. Smith, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1318 (N.D. Okla. 2001) (finding that a
lifetime ban on firearm possession is a serious penalty).
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triggering a defendants right to a jury trial by filing a misdemeanor
charge instead of a felony one.
C. Increasing (or at Least Not Decreasing) the Likelihood of
Conviction
According to many scholars, prosecutors function as conviction
maximizers.164 Regardless of whether prosecutors are in fact max-
imizing convictions or something else,165 there is little doubt that
concerns about likelihood of conviction are often at the forefront of
a prosecutors mind when deciding what charges to pursue in a giv-
en case.166 In a field where objective metrics for job success are thin,
a prosecutors conviction rate is often used as the principal mea-
sure of prosecutorial job performance.167 Thus, prosecutors con-
cerned with career advancement (or even just career stability) are
likely to place a premium on their win-loss statistics.168 And for
offices where the chief prosecutor is elected, the need to maximize
convictions will be an inescapable environmental constraint.169 As
Daniel Richman has explained, [t]hose elections that are contested
are often fought on an incumbents win-loss record, and an incum-
bents concerns in this regard will be felt by his subordinates.170 For
164. See Bowers, supra note 18, at 1128. For a small sampling of the many scholars who
assert prosecutors are conviction maximizers, see the sources cited in Bibas, supra note 116,
at 2471-72 nn.20-23 and Bowers, supra note 18, at 1128 n.45.
165. See supra note 115.
166. See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 967 (1997); see also supra note 119 (recounting that the
prosecutors I interviewed identified strength of the evidence as one of three principal consid-
erations for initial charging decisions).
167. Bowers, supra note 87, at 1711; see id. at 1710 n.265; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The
Prosecutors Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 106 (1968) (Conviction statistics
seem to most prosecutors a tangible measure of their success.); Bowers, supra note 18, at
1149 (The conviction rate, after all, is the most visible rubric of quality job performance.).
168. See Bibas, supra note 116, at 2471 (observing that prosecutors may further their
careers by racking up good win-loss records); Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in
the Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036,
1045 (1972) ([C]onvictions are the central performance standard, and departures from the
average rate raise questions and create anxieties.). As Stephanos Bibas notes, [f]avorable
win-loss statistics can also provide many psychic benefits, including boost[ing] prosecutors
egos, their esteem, [and] their praise by colleagues. Bibas, supra note 116, at 2471.
169. Richman, supra note 166, at 967.
170. Id. This is not to suggest that appointed prosecutors care less about win-loss statis-
tics than their elected peers. But the vast majority of chief prosecutors in the United States
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these reasons, prosecutorial office culture is often described as one
dominated by the mantra of nondefeat.171
In its purest form, concerns about likelihood of conviction are
trained on the strength of the evidence and whether the prosecutor
thinks the ultimate adjudicatora judge or juryis likely to enter
a judgment of conviction.172 But concerns about likelihood of convic-
tion can also encompass other considerations, such as the likelihood
that a particular set of charges will induce a defendant to plead
guilty. The strength of the evidence (and how that evidence will be
received by the ultimate adjudicator) still plays a leading role in
that assessment, but other factors may also be relevant.173
In some ways, the strength of the governments case will be
minimally affected by whether the case is charged as a felony or a
misdemeanor. For example, the existence of incriminating physical
evidence, the content and credibility of potential witness testimony,
and the persuasiveness of certain defenses (such as an alibi) typi-
cally do not turn on the nature of the charge.
To the extent the strength of the governments case varies, how-
ever, it does so because of a difference in the elements of the offense
the government seeks to prove. In this respect, misdemeanors are
almost always easier to prove than felonies. Misdemeanors tend to
have fewer elements than their felony counterparts.174 Felonies also
are elected, and the prospect of a future election is a variable unique to those offices. See
Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 734
(1996) (observing that over 95 percent of chief prosecutors at the state and local level are
elected); see also STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS [BJS], DOJ, NCJ 213799,
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 2 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc05.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7H47-4GQF] (Except for Alaska, Connecticut, the District of Columbia,
and New Jersey, all chief prosecutors in 2005 were elected officials.).
171. Bowers, supra note 18, at 1128 (At bottom, prosecutors carry mindsets of non-
defeat.); see also Meares, supra note 23, at 869 ([A]n abhorrence of losing ... is central to
prosecutorial culture.); Richman, supra note 166, at 968. For an old but still oft-cited study
detailing this phenomenon, see Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System,
11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52, 57 (1967) (In the county studied, the prosecutors office cared less
about winning than about not losing. The norm is so intrinsic to the rationale of the prose-
cutors office that one does not often hear it articulated. Nevertheless it is very powerful.).
172. See supra note 119.
173. See generally Bibas, supra note 116.
174. For example, under New York law, a person is guilty of criminal possession of a con-
trolled substance in the seventh degreea misdemeanorif he knowingly and unlawfully
possesses a controlled substance. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.03 (McKinney 2015). By contrast,
in order to prove that a person committed criminal possession of a controlled substance in the
2016] CHARGING ON THE MARGIN 813
typically have more demanding injury or harm requirements than
corresponding misdemeanors.175
In addition, felonies sometimes have heightened mens rea re-
quirements in comparison to misdemeanors.176 Beyond simply being
harder to prove, heightened mens rea requirements can unlock
additional lines of defense for the defendant, depending on the
jurisdiction. For example, in most jurisdictions, a defendant charged
with a specific intent crime may claim that he was too intoxicated
to form the requisite intent.177 But that same defendant will likely
be prohibited from mounting a voluntary intoxication defense, if
charged with an offense requiring only a general intent.178 Accord-
ingly, if the prosecutor expects that voluntary intoxication may be
a credible line of defense, then he would have additional reason to
consider charging a lesser offense that requires only a general in-
tent instead of a higher grade offense that requires specific intent.
Another reason why a misdemeanor charge may have a higher
likelihood of conviction (or, equally important for present purposes,
the perception of a higher likelihood of conviction) in a particular
fifth degreea low-grade felonythe government must establish any one of several additional
elements, such as intent to sell the substance or that he possessed at least a certain amount
of the substance. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.06 (McKinney 2003) (government must prove one of
eight additional elements). For those scoring at home, New York no longer has an offense
labeled criminal possession of a controlled substance in the sixth degree.
175. For example, under District of Columbia law, a person is guilty of felonious assault
and faces up to three years imprisonmentif he unlawfully assaults, or threatens another
in a menacing manner, and intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes significant bodily
injury to another. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-404(a)(2) (West 2013). Significant bodily injury is
defined as one that requires hospitalization or immediate medical attention. Id. Mis-
demeanor assault, by contrast, has no significant bodily injury requirement. See id. § 22-
404(a)(1).
176. For example, under New York law, a person is guilty of assault in the third degreea
misdemeanorif [w]ith criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person
by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00(3)
(McKinney 1965). In order to establish that a person is guilty of assault in the second de-
greea low-grade felonythe government must instead prove that the defendant committed
the assault [w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another person. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 120.05(2) (McKinney 2014).
177. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 47-48 (1996) (observing that a majority of
American jurisdictions permit a voluntary intoxication defense only for specific intent
crimes); see also State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012) (explaining that voluntary
intoxication defense is permissible for specific intent, but not general intent, crimes).
178. See Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 307. Some states do not allow a voluntary intoxication
defense to any offense. See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ind. 2001). But that
is the minority position. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 48 n.2.
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case relates to differences between a bench trial and a jury trial.179
Generally speaking, a defendant is more likely to be convicted after
a bench trial than a jury trial.180 Of course, there are exceptions to
this observation, depending both on the jurisdiction and the offense
charged. But the best studies to date have concluded that judges are
more likely to convict than juries.181 Perhaps relatedly, judicial
officers in most jurisdictions are subject to some form of election.182
Judges forced to navigate the perilous waters of electoral politics
may be more inclined to convict than a jury of the defendants peers,
none of whom face a future election challenge.183
In some jurisdictions, including several that encompass the coun-
trys largest urban populations, juries have a well-earned reputation
for being particularly hostile to certain criminal prosecutions. For
example, the so-called Bronx jury became famous (or infamous)
after juries in the Bronx consistently returned acquittals at a rate
far above the national average.184 The Bronx is far from alone on
that score, and there is evidence of significantly higher acquittal
rates in the District of Columbia, Baltimore, Detroit, and Los
179. As noted earlier, some misdemeanor defendants lack the right to demand a jury trial.
See supra Part II.B.3.
180. See infra note 187.
181. See Adam M. Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men: The Case for Eliminating Jury Trials
in Drunk Driving Cases, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 971-76 (summarizing the considerable
empirical and qualitative evidence that judges are more willing to convict than juries). But
see Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 151
(2005) (exploring potential reasons why, since the late 1980s, acquittal rates for federal judg-
es outpace the acquittal rates for federal juries).
182. See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Why Habeas Review of State Court Convictions Is
More Important than Ever, 24 FED. SENTG REP. 292, 292 (2012) (Thirty-nine states permit
voters to elect or retain judges.). In fact, eighty-seven percent of all state judges stand for
some form of election. Id. at n.5 (citing Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 149, 154 (1998)).
183. See id. at 292-94 (discussing various examples in which judicial campaigns focused
on an incumbents record in criminal cases); see also Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular Justice:
State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 201
(1996) (Crime in general has become more of a high profile issue in political discourse, and
no politician wants to be classified as soft on crime. Elected judges are no exception.)
(footnote omitted). See generally Joanna Cohn Weiss, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for
State Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101
(2006).
184. See Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 899-900
(1999).
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Angelesjust to name a few.185 This phenomenon has been explain-
ed as the inevitable byproduct of drawing a jury pool from commu-
nities that harbor such profound and problematic systemic distrust
of law enforcement.186 Regardless of the reason, prosecutors in such
jurisdictions are likely to believe that avoiding the prospect of a jury
trial will significantly increase the odds of conviction.187
Even when the defendant has a right to a jury trial, the nature of
that right often varies depending on whether he has been charged
with a felony or a misdemeanor. Although nearly every state has
twelve jurors sit on a felony case,188 many states have fewer jurors
serve on misdemeanor cases.189 For example, in Texas only six jur-
ors sit on a trial involving a misdemeanor offense.190 And some
states permit even fewer than six jurors in petty offense cases
(where the federal constitutional requirement of a six-juror
minimum does not apply).191 Smaller juries tend to favor the
185. See id. at 900 n.114. Prosecutors may also sometimes believe that jurors have skewed
expectations about the level of evidence necessary to satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. Much has been made of the so-called CSI effect on juries. See generally Tom R.
Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and
Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050 (2006). Although there is no evidence confirming that the CSI
effect is an actual phenomenon, it remains a widely-shared perception among many govern-
ment officials.
186. Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 110 n.119 (2007).
187. See Interview with D, supra note 107 (acknowledging that, in a jurisdiction where the
jury pool is understood to be generally distrustful of law enforcement, cases perceived to not
play well before a jury were more likely to be charged as a misdemeanor in order to have a
bench trial, even if that meant the charging decision does not always line up with the
brutality of the crime). But see Telephone Interview with Individual B, Former Prosecutor
(June 3, 2015) (stating that juries in a rural East Coast community were very conservative
and thus the jury pool was never a concern).
188. See 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 22.1(d) (Only six states authorize juries of less
than 12 in felony cases.).
189. See id. at 19 n.79.
190. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 33.01(b) (West 2004).
191. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-104(d) (West 2008) (four jurors sit on petty
misdemeanor cases). If a defendant enjoys a federal constitutional right to a jury trial, the
jury must include at least six persons. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978) (declar-
ing a five-person jury unconstitutional in a nonpetty offense case).
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prosecution,192 making this yet another reason a prosecutor may
prefer charging a misdemeanor instead of a felony.
Finally, regardless of whether the ultimate adjudicator is a judge
or a jury, a rich body of empirical and experimental studies indi-
cates ... that fact finders adjust the burden of proof in accordance
with the size of the applicable sanction.193 Specifically, studies show
that judges and jurors often elevate the probative threshold for
conviction as the severity of the punishment increases.194 Because
felonies carry more punishment than misdemeanors, these studies
suggest that the fact finder will be less likely to convicteven if
marginallyfor the felony than for the misdemeanor.195
When it comes to the likelihood of inducing a guilty plea, the rel-
ative strength of a prosecutors case will have a significant effect on
the negotiations. Thus, for all the reasons just discussed, a prosecu-
tors case will often appear stronger when viewed through the lens
of a misdemeanor.
But there are other relevant considerations, and those additional
factors present more of a mixed bag. For example, the threat of
increased incarceration associated with a felony charge may give
additional leverage to the prosecutor seeking to induce a guilty plea.
However, the actual difference in expected prison time can often
be relatively small, thereby minimizing the effectiveness of that
threat.196
192. See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 332 (1980) ([S]tatistical and empirical data
established that because of a concomitant decrease in the number of hung juries, a reduction
in the size of the jury panel in criminal cases unfairly disadvantages one sidethe defense.);
see also id. at 332 n.10 (identifying three reasons why smaller juries tend to favor the
prosecution).
193. Ehud Guttel & Doron Teichman, Criminal Sanctions in the Defense of the Innocent,
110 MICH. L. REV. 597, 598 (2012); see id. at 601-07 (surveying studies).
194. Id. at 598; see also Richman, supra note 166, at 972 n.115 (listing studies conducted
on this subject).
195. See Cade, supra note 73, at 1795 (Studies have suggested that adjudicators convict
on less evidence where defendants are charged with minor offenses or face less severe crim-
inal sanctions.). Even though a jury is typically not aware of the specific penalties at stake,
it will likely have a sense of the relative severity of an offense based on its name alone. For
example, many offenses indicate whether they are a felony or a misdemeanor. And some, such
as aggravated assault versus simple assault, can clue-in an otherwise unfamiliar jury.
196. See infra Part II.D. Vertical overcharging is most potent when the potential trial
penaltythe difference between a post-trial sentence and guilty plea sentenceis especially
severe. For many low-grade felonies, however, the potential trial penalty will not be exorbi-
tant, since the maximum term of incarceration is typically only a few years.
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In addition, a defendant facing a felony charge can threaten to
impose more procedural and administrative demands on the
prosecutor than he could if he were charged with only a misde-
meanor.197 As Josh Bowers has correctly recognized, the defense
team typically enjoys one significant advantage over the prosecu-
tor: the defendant has a call on the prosecutors time.198 Felony
defendants can almost always call more of a prosecutors time
than can misdemeanor defendantsmeaning the threat to do so is
more powerful when coming from a felony defendant.199 And defen-
dants facing one of the severe collateral consequences highlighted
here, such as deportation or sex offender registration, may be espe-
cially inclined to fight the charges to the bitter endand therefore
be perceived at the time of charging as someone more likely to ac-
tually call the prosecutors time.200
Potential differences in counsel may also play a role. A felony
defendant is likely to have better and more experienced counsel,
plus an attorney with superior resources and opportunities to inves-
tigate, file motions, and actually bargain with the prosecutor.201 By
contrast, misdemeanor defendants are often lucky to get their law-
yers individual attention for more than a few minutes. And those
lawyers are usually so overburdened that independent investigation
and case analysis are often the exception rather than the rule.202
In the end, whether a felony or misdemeanor charge is more like-
ly to induce a plea will probably vary from case to case. But more
often than not, the governments case is likely to be viewed as
strongerin terms of likelihood of conviction at trialif charged as
197. See supra Part II.B.
198. Bowers, supra note 18, at 1151.
199. As Bowers points out, [t]he best defense tool in the face of an atypically high price
thenor even just a price that the defendant does not particularly likeis to create the
perception that the defendant is willing to engage her own process costs. Id. at 1152. Because
felony cases have more process costs, felony defendants generally have more procedural chips
with which to bargain. See id.
200. See Interview with A, supra note 107 (observing that it was, on average, more difficult
to secure a plea agreement when the defendant would be facing deportation or sex offender
registration); Interview with D, supra note 107; Interview with G, supra note 55; see also
Eagly, supra note 79, at 1195-96 & nn.315-16 (reporting that noncitizen defendants in Harris
County, Texas charged with deportable offenses appear to be disproportionately inclined to
take their cases to trial).
201. See infra notes 237, 247 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 239-43 and accompanying text.
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a misdemeanor rather than a felony. That fact alone means prose-
cutors will not reflexively choose the felony charge, assuming the
misdemeanor offense also provides an adequate penalty (including
the pertinent collateral consequence) upon conviction.
D. The (Minimal) Penalty Sacrifice
The primary concession prosecutors make when filing a mis-
demeanor instead of a felony is foregoing the additional penalties
offered by the felony offensein particular the possibility of
increased incarceration. Before examining the degree to which
expected prison time differs between low-grade felonies and misde-
meanorsand therefore how much prison time prosecutors are
actually surrendering when choosing the misdemeanor offenseit
is important to appreciate how prosecutors typically approach the
issue of potential penalties.
Prosecutors generally have a preferred penalty for each case. I do
not mean to suggest that prosecutors formally assign each case such
a value. But prosecutors routinely, even if only implicitly, have a
rough idea of what a case is worthor, perhaps more precisely,
what a defendant deservesin terms of appropriate penalties.203
Critically, a prosecutors preferred penalty is seldom the most
severe one she can possibly seek under the law. Put another way,
prosecutors rarely operate as sentence maximizers.204 In the words
of William Stuntz, however prosecutors define their preferred sen-
tence, there is no good reason to assume that their preference is
always for the harshest sentence they can possibly get.205 This is
because, as Stuntz colorfully put it, [p]rosecutors are not like civil
plaintiffs: they are not paid by the conviction, with bonuses for each
additional month the defendant spends in prison.206 Once the
defendants sentence has reached the level the prosecutor prefers,
203. See Bowers, supra note 18, at 1146-47; Stuntz, supra note 88, at 2564.
204. Bowers, supra note 18, at 1128; see also Bibas, supra note 116, at 2471-75. To the
extent prosecutors ever act as sentence maximizers, it is only for those offenses at the top of
the severity ladder. See Bowers, supra note 18, at 1153 (In serious cases, prosecutors drive
harder bargains and aim for sentence maximization to a greater degree.). But those espe-
cially severe cases fall outside the scope of this Article.
205. Stuntz, supra note 88, at 2554.
206. Id.
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Stuntz observed, adding more time offers no benefit to the prosecu-
tor.207
Perhaps the best evidence that prosecutors typically have pre-
ferred penalties that are not the most severe available under the
law is a series of studies that examined how prosecutors exercise
their charging discretion when navigating mandatory minimum
sentences or three-strike repeat offender laws.208 In one such
study, David Bjerk demonstrated that after the imposition of a
three-strike repeat offender law, prosecutors [became] almost
twice as likely to prosecute three-strikes arrestees for lesser
misdemeanor crimes not covered by the laws.209 Bjerk also con-
cluded that such behavior [was] the result of prosecutors using
their discretion to partially circumvent three-strikes laws owing to
[the prosecutors] own constraints and preferences, not simply in
response to changes in behavior by other actors within the judicial
system.210 In other words, prosecutors altered their charging be-
havior in order to achieve a preferred penalty based on their own
belief about what each defendant deserved.
One further point bears mentioning. Recall that for low-level
offenses, prosecutors will often view the imposition of certain collat-
eral consequencesfor example, sex offender registration, firearm
prohibitions, or deportationto be as important, if not more impor-
tant, than any term of incarceration.211 For that reason, there are
likely many cases in which a prosecutor is relatively indifferent to
the amount of prison time imposed on a defendant, so long as a
particular collateral consequence is imposed. For example, when a
prosecutor confronts a low-grade sex offense, the most important
penalty is likely to be sex offender registration, not the prospect of
a few additional months in prison.212
207. Id.
208. See Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, in CRIME AND JUSTICE IN
AMERICA,1975-2025, at 141, 166 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013) (summarizing six major studies). 
209. David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion
Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & ECON. 591, 593 (2005).
210. Id.
211. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Interview with E, supra note 119 (explaining that sex offender registration
was usually treated as nonnegotiable in sex offense prosecutions and recounting cases in
which she agreed to reduced terms of incarceration in exchange for a guilty plea that included
sex offender registration); Interview with I, supra note 113 (stating that sex offender registra-
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This also means that an inability to impose a particular collateral
consequence for a misdemeanor conviction might effectively take
that charging option off the table. But when the same collateral
consequence is available for a misdemeanor conviction as for a
felony conviction, that particular disincentive to pursuing a mis-
demeanor has been removed.
If the collateral consequence at issue can be imposed for both a
misdemeanor and a felony conviction, the main penalty difference
between the two is the length of incarceration. But whereas the
maximum potential prison terms authorized by each type of offense
may be years apart, the actual amount of incarceration imposed on
a defendant for conduct that could feasibly be charged as a misde-
meanor or low-grade felony will often differ much less.
First, a significant number of felony convictions result in little
or no actual jail time.213 In 2006 (the most recent year reported by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics), 31 percent of all state criminal
defendants convicted of a felony were sentenced to no term of im-
prisonment, and another 28 percent were sentenced only to a local
jail (which is typically reserved for defendants incarcerated for less
than one year).214 The average prison sentence in state courts that
year for all felony defendants was about three years.215 The average
prison sentence for defendants convicted of only low-grade felonies
was likely much less.216
Second, even if a defendant convicted of a felony was sentenced
to incarceration for more than one year, it is not necessarily the case
that the defendant would actually serve that full amount of time
before being released. Defendants may obtain good time credits
while in prison, which can reduce the total period of incarceration
in some jurisdictions by at least one-third.217
tion was the most important goal in sex offense cases and that it was very rare to give [that
penalty] up in exchange for a guilty plea, but that she was generally willing to give up jail
time and length of probation).
213. See Bowers, supra note 18, at 1145 n.139; Chin, supra note 4, at 153.
214. SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BJS, DOJ, NCJ 226846, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURTS, 2006STATISTICAL TABLES 2 (rev. ed. 2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
fssc06st.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR6Y-H2VS].
215. Id.
216. See id.
217. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 18, at 1145 ([U]nder New York law, defendants serve
only two-thirds of their sentenced jail time, calculated from the moment of arrest. (citing N.Y.
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Third, some studies have indicated that courts with limited or
specialized jurisdictionincluding many misdemeanor courts and
domestic violence courtsmay sentence a borderline felony/misde-
meanor case more harshly than would a general felony court that
routinely adjudicates more serious offenses.218 According to scholars,
the differing responses stem from the courts differing baselines, as
the borderline offense may appear relatively serious to a court
whose typical case is a petty offense, but that same conduct might
appear relatively mild to a court immersed in higher gravity
cases.219
Finally, if prosecutors are keen on seeking more than one year
of imprisonment, they need not always file a felony charge to
achieve that goal. Instead, prosecutors can bring multiple misde-
meanor chargesa practice sometimes called stackingand
request that the prison sentences for each convicted offense be
served consecutively.220 If successful, the ultimate prison sentence
could be well in excess of one year. And, critically, the practice of
stacking misdemeanors does not trigger the bundle of procedural
guarantees typically afforded defendants charged with a felony.
In sum, although a low-grade felony prosecution could potentially
lead to a longer term of incarceration than a misdemeanor prosecu-
tion, the difference in actual incarceration may often be relatively
smallone that is more likely to be measured in months rather
than years.
* * *
PENAL LAW § 70.30(3) (McKinney 1998))).
218. See Adi Leibovitch, Relative Judgments 29-31 (unpublished manuscript), http://www.
law.uchicago.edu/files/files/leibovitch_relative_judgments.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS5D-VSBA].
219. See id. at 30 ([W]hen recidivist domestic violence offenders in Chicago were charged
with felonies (at the Criminal Court) instead of misdemeanors [(at the Domestic Violence
Division)], the felony charges received lower sentences than those that would have been
ordered for equivalent misdemeanors by the Domestic Violence Division.).
220. The ultimate effectiveness of such stacking will depend on whether the trial court
orders that the sentences for multiple convictions run consecutively or concurrently. Most
states entrust to judges unfettered discretion the decision whether sentences for discrete
offenses shall be served consecutively or concurrently. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 163-64
(2009).
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The upshot of all this is that although prosecutors do forego addi-
tional penalties by pursuing a misdemeanor case, that sacrifice may
not be as significant as it first appears. As a result, prosecutors
often have strong incentives to relinquish the possibility of addition-
al incarceration in exchange for the efficiency and likelihood of
conviction gains that typically accompany misdemeanor prosecu-
tions. And if a prosecutor cares primarily about the imposition of the
collateral consequence in a given case, the calculation is straightfor-
ward. Indeed, there is no real tradeoff at all.221
III. STRATEGIC UNDERCHARGINGS RIPPLE EFFECTS
At first glance, the choice to file a misdemeanor instead of a
felony may appear to be relatively insignificant. In a world of guilty
pleas, one might ask, what difference does it really make? But mis-
demeanor prosecutions and felony prosecutions differ in critical
ways, including ways that can affect a cases ultimate disposition.222
As already detailed, misdemeanor defendants are typically afforded
fewer procedural protections than felony defendants. The following
Part examines some of the other ripple effects caused by a prosecu-
tors decision to engage in strategic undercharging.223
A. Misdemeanor Courts
In most states, misdemeanors are adjudicated in different trial
courts than felonies.224 While felony dockets have no shortage of
221. Consider the following experience of a domestic violence prosecutor in a large, Mid-
western jurisdiction. According to this prosecutor, many domestic violence defendants in his
jurisdiction, especially first-time offenders, are unlikely to receive any term of incarceration
upon conviction, even when convicted of a felony. At the same time, his office (like many
others) prioritizes the imposition of firearm prohibitions in domestic violence cases. Because
the defendants expected prison exposure is often the same for a felony as a misdemeanor,
the prosecutor acknowledged that he sometimes files a misdemeanor charge because the
defendant will get probation regardless, you still get the gun out of the house, and the
process is much quicker. Interview with K, supra note 97.
222. See generally Natapoff, supra note 13.
223. The effects highlighted in this Part primarily relate to state, not federal, prosecutions.
State prosecutions account for about 98 percent of all criminal prosecutions in the United
States. See 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 1.2(e).
224. See NATL ASSN OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICAS BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009), https://www.nacdl.
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cases, misdemeanor courts are typically bursting at the seams.
According to one recent study, state trial courts of limited juris-
diction (those primarily responsible for misdemeanor cases) handled
more than three times as many cases as state trial courts of general
jurisdiction (those primarily responsible for felony cases).225 The
docket disparity is even greater when one focuses on criminal
cases.226 In Washington, for example, state trial courts of limited
jurisdiction processed nearly 300,000 criminal cases in 2010, where-
as state trial courts of general jurisdiction processed about 38,500
criminal cases.227 Other states experience similar disparities.228
In 1972, the Supreme Court cautioned that the volume of mis-
demeanor cases, far greater in number than felony prosecutions,
may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the
fairness of the result.229 A fixation on clearing dockets is likely even
more pronounced today, because the number of misdemeanors is
now double what it was in 1972.230
org/reports/misdemeanor/ [https://perma.cc/G2HJ-HQ9S]; see also Issa Kohler-Hausmann,
Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. SOC. 351, 359 n.8 (2013).
225. See R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NATL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF
STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 3 (2012), http://www.court
statistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSP_DEC.ashx [https://perma.cc/
7KEW-FLUR].
226. See id.
227. Id. at 21. Because courts of limited jurisdiction also process preliminary felony
matters, some felony cases are counted twiceonce in the court of limited jurisdiction for
the preliminary matter and again in the court of general jurisdiction for subsequent pro-
ceedings. See id. at 19.
228. See id. at 21 (courts of limited jurisdiction in Michigan processed 867,100 criminal
cases and courts of general jurisdiction processed 63,224 criminal cases).
229. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972) (An inevitable consequence of [such]
volume ... is the almost total preoccupation in such a court with the movement of cases.
(quoting PRESIDENTS COMMN ON LAW ENFT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME
IN A FREE SOCIETY 128 (1967))).
230. In Argersinger, the Court estimated that between four and five million cases involved
misdemeanors. 407 U.S. at 34 n.4. Today, the best estimates place that number northward
of ten million. See Natapoff, supra note 13, at 1320-21. Much (though not all) of the increase
is likely attributable to widespread adoption of a policing strategy called order maintenance
policing or the broken windows theory. See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 113, at 632-33,
639.
For a small but representative sampling of the extensive literature on order maintenance
policing and the broken windows theory, see WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, TURN-
AROUND: HOW AMERICAS TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 152 (1998); BERNARD E.
HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 1-4
(2001); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York
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Given the pressures to process cases rapidly,231 misdemeanor
judges must limit the amount of time they spend on any particular
matter.232 This means they have less time for holding in-person
hearings and instead decide more issues on the papers alone. This
also means they have less time for engaging defendants in searching
plea colloquies, which are supposed to be the final backstop for
ensuring that there is a factual basis for the plea and a knowing and
voluntary waiver of various constitutional rights.233
Misdemeanor courts, moreover, usually operate with their own
pool of judges. As Eve Brensike Primus has detailed, [s]tate mis-
demeanor judges often have smaller salaries and occupy positions
of less prestige than their felony counterparts. As a result, more
qualified applicants are naturally attracted to the felony courts.234
Further, [i]n a number of states, such as Arizona, Missouri, New
York, and Pennsylvania, some of the judges in these [misdemeanor]
courts are not lawyers.235 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the average dif-
ference between misdemeanor judges and felony judgesboth in
terms of the judges knowledge of the law and their receptivity to
legal argumentshas been described by some as astounding.236
City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006); George L. Kelling &
James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1982, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/
[https://perma.cc/8K37-EMHR] (introducing the broken windows theory).
231. Among other things, docket clearance rate is a common component of judicial per-
formance evaluations. For example, the National Center for State Courts has developed ten
criteria to measure court performance, and three of those criteria rate a judges ability to ef-
fectively manage her docket. See NATL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, TRIAL COURT PERFORMANCE
MEASURES (2005), http://www.courtools.org/Trial-Court-Performance-Measures.aspx [https://
perma.cc/PXQ6-9ZG3].
232. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1043 (2013).
233. See id. at 1071-72. As Natapoff notes, some courts have even taken to doing pleas en
masse. See id. at 1072-73 (detailing practice in one Arizona court where judges routinely
presided over fifty-to-seventy defendants pleading guilty at once).
234. Eve Brensike Primus, Our Broken Misdemeanor Justice System: Its Problems and
Some Potential Solutions, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 80, 81 (2013).
235. See NATL ASSN OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 224, at 11.
236. Primus, supra note 234, at 81. Moreover, because felony convictions get appealed at
much higher rates than do misdemeanor convictions ... misdemeanor judges are relatively
insulated from higher court feedback and do not learn of their mistakes in the same way that
felony trial court judges do. Id.
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B. Misdemeanor Defense Counsel
Another key consequence of strategic undercharging relates to
the defense counsel that misdemeanor defendants receive. Misde-
meanor defense attorneys are typically less experienced than felony
defense attorneys.237 Among other things, this means they have had
comparatively less time to establish credibility with local prosecu-
torsa trait that is often critical to counsels ability to plea bargain
effectively.238
In addition, defense attorneys handling misdemeanors typically
carry greater caseloads than their felony colleagues.239 The most
widely recognized caseload guidelines provide that defense attor-
neys should not exceed four hundred misdemeanor cases an-
nually.240 Many defense attorneys, however, go far past that
recommended limit.241 One recent study found that public defenders
in Chicago, Atlanta, and Miami average more than two thousand
misdemeanor cases per year.242 That same study reported similar
excesses in a variety of other jurisdictions.243
The defense attorneys managing these caseloads are usually
public defenders compensated by a fixed salary or court-appointed
237. Cade, supra note 73, at 1787 ([M]isdemeanor defenders typically have little expe-
rience.).
238. See Bibas, supra note 116, at 2534. Depending on the greenness of the attorney, it may
also mean that counsel is not yet aware of the various collateral consequences that may attach
upon conviction. For now at least, the Supreme Court has limited the Sixth Amendment right
that it recognized in Padillathat counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries
a risk of deportationto the penalty of deportation. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374
(2010). Accordingly, defense counsels failure to advise her client of other potential collateral
consequences of conviction is not a ground for a later ineffective assistance claim.
239. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 461, 470-71 (2007); Roberts, supra note 44, at 294. Of course, stifling defense caseloads
are not unique to misdemeanor attorneys. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense
Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 812 (2004);
Roberts, Ignorance, supra note 26, at 146-47 (describing crushing caseload conditions facing
defense attorneys). That said, individuals facing misdemeanor charges are more likely to
suffer the consequences of the workload strain. Roberts, supra note 44, at 294.
240. See Hashimoto, supra note 239, at 487 n.122, 504 n.180; Roberts, supra note 44, at
295.
241. See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 13, at 1342-43; NATL ASSN OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAW-
YERS, supra note 224, at 21.
242. NATL ASSN OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 224, at 21.
243. See id. at 20-22.
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attorneys operating under strictly-limited fee caps.244 For the latter,
the fees are typically capped at a fraction of the funding allotted for
felony cases.245 In Illinois, for example, payment to court-appointed
counsel may not exceed $500 for a defendant charged with a mis-
demeanor, yet payment may not exceed ... $5,000 for a defendant
charged with a felony.246 The combination of a demanding caseload
with either a fixed salary or depressed fee caps can have deleterious
effects on an attorneys ability and incentive to perform the costly
work of investigating potential defenses, filing motions, negotiating
with the prosecutor, or personally meeting with the defendant to
discuss any number of pertinent issues (including potential con-
sequences of conviction).247
This is particularly significant given that misdemeanor attorneys
typically receive much less free (or low-cost) discovery than their
felony counterparts.248 As a result, misdemeanor defense counsel
must rely even more on the fruits of their own investigation in order
to assess the strength of the governments case. But, for the reasons
noted,249 misdemeanor defense attorneys will often be the ones least
able to perform that critical task.
Some misdemeanor defendants lack access to counsel altogeth-
er.250 An indigent defendant charged with a misdemeanor has a
constitutional right to government-provided counsel only if he is
244. Most misdemeanor defendants are indigent. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus,
The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034
(2006) (Poor people account for more than 80% of individuals prosecuted.).
245. Roberts, supra note 44, at 326-27, 327 n.214. Court-appointed attorneys are typically
paid on a per case basis. Cade, supra note 73, at 1788.
246. See 725 ILL.COMP.STAT. 5/113-3.1(b) (1994). Curiously, the same statute provides that
court-appointed counsel may receive up to $2,500 for a defendant who is appealing a con-
viction of any class offense. Id. In other words, counsel is entitled to five times as much
funding for appealing a misdemeanor conviction as he is for trying to avoid that conviction in
the first place.
247. See Roberts, supra note 44, at 317-18 (Misdemeanor attorneys across the country
handle caseloads that make almost any investigation difficult.); Bibas, supra note 116, at
2479-80.
248. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 237-47 and accompanying text.
250. There also is compelling evidence that indigent defendants, petty offenders in par-
ticular, often do not get counsel even when they are legally entitled to it. Natapoff, supra note
13, at 1340-43 (collecting and summarizing various studies showing lack of access to counsel
for indigent petty offenders).
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actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment.251 Nearly half of the
states have exceeded that federal floor and provide counsel to an
indigent defendant if he is charged with a misdemeanor that merely
authorizes incarceration.252 But a significant number of states still
limit the right to counsel for at least some misdemeanor offenses
to those instances in which imprisonment is actually imposed.253
As with other constitutional safeguards, an offenses potential col-
lateral consequences are generally considered irrelevant when
determining whether the defendant has a right to counsel.254
C. Misdemeanor Prosecutors
Strategic undercharging can also affect which line prosecutor is
responsible for handling the case.255 This choice is important be-
cause misdemeanor prosecutors can differ in meaningful ways from
felony prosecutors. Misdemeanor prosecutors are frequently the
most junior and least experienced attorneys in the office.256 Given
their lack of seniority, misdemeanor prosecutors often need
supervisory approval for any number of case-altering decisions.257
251. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979). In Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662
(2002), the Supreme Court clarified that a suspended prison sentence also may not be imposed
on a misdemeanor defendant unless he was represented by counsel. An indigent defendant
charged with a felony, however, has an absolute right to government-provided counsel. See
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). This is true regardless of whether any prison time
is actually imposed on the defendant. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 743 n.9
(1994).
252. See 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 11.2(a).
253. See id. at 619 n.30; see also Shelton, 535 U.S. at 669 n.8.
254. As a matter of federal constitutional law, courts have uniformly concluded that an
offenses potential collateral consequences have no bearing on whether an indigent defendant
is entitled to counsel. See Clapman, supra note 26, at 603. As a matter of state law, a handful
of jurisdictions have indicated that an offenses collateral consequences may be relevant to
defining the scope of the right. See 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 11.2(a), at 620 n.34. But
those jurisdictions are few in number and, generally speaking, appear to consider an offenses
collateral consequences as merely one factor among many when deciding whether the right
to state-provided counsel applies in a given case.
255. This is particularly true in large prosecutors offices that have dedicated misdemeanor
units. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
256. See Lee, supra note 73, at 596.
257. Bowers, supra note 18, at 1128 ([L]ine prosecutors often must obtain supervisory
approval before dismissing cases.); Cade, supra note 73, at 1783 (New prosecutors, cutting
their teeth on misdemeanor cases, may need permission from supervisors to deviate signi-
ficantly from the original charge.).
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Unsurprisingly, junior prosecutors tend to be the most deferential
to supervisory authority and are therefore least likely to buck
[office] policy.258 As a result, misdemeanor prosecutors may be less
likely to second-guess the initial charging decisions that were made
by more senior prosecutors in the office.259
Misdemeanor prosecutors also tend to carry caseloads that far
outpace their felony colleagues.260 For example, one leading study
reports that misdemeanor prosecutors in many of the countrys most
populous districts are responsible for hundreds of cases at any given
time.261 For example, [i]n Tarrant County, Texas, home of Fort
Worth, ... misdemeanor prosecutors juggle between 1200 and 1500
matters apiece.262
Given such caseloads, a prosecutors capacity to scrutinize the
merits of a particular case will typically be quite limited. As one
prosecutor I interviewed put it: The amount of attention you can
give to a misdemeanor is a fraction of the attention you can give a
felony. There is rarely an opportunity to reevaluate the case after
the initial charging decision and determine whether different char-
ges are more appropriate.263 This reality is particularly significant
since cases charged as misdemeanors are not subjected to an
independent, initial screening mechanism, such as a grand jury or
a preliminary hearing.264
Finally, new prosecutors tend to be systematically harsher than
their more senior colleagues.265 Among other things, this means they
258. Bowers, supra note 87, at 1704.
259. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
260. See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 268-70 tbl.1
(2011).
261. See id. (giving examples from most of the countrys largest cities, including Los
Angeles, Chicago, Manhattan, Brooklyn, Miami, Philadelphia, and Dallas); see also Kohler-
Hausmann, supra note 113, at 664 n.150 (observing that, in New York City, Assistant District
Attorneys often carry upwards of two hundred open misdemeanor cases at any given time).
262. Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 260, at 272. For a synopsis of potential harms
caused by excessive prosecutorial caseloads generally, see id. at 279-96.
263. Interview with K, supra note 97.
264. See supra Part II.B.1; see also Interview with K, supra note 97 ([M]isdemeanors are
unloved from the beginning.).
265. Bibas, supra note 116, at 2475; see also Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion,
Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 190 (2007) (quoting one former
prosecutor: As a baby DA, I thought all criminals needed to be punished to the fullest extent
of the law.).
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are less likely to bargain away potential penalties on equitable
grounds alone.266 [I]nexperienced prosecutors are also more likely
to press for overly broad categories in their sentencing recommen-
dations, when more individualized judgments could produce more
proportional and economical sentencing.267
IV. TAKING SERIOUS MISDEMEANORS SERIOUSLY
In many respects, misdemeanors and felonies are processed in
two different worlds: different judges, different attorneys, different
docket pressures, and different procedures. This Part focuses on
that last differencethe procedural disparity between misdemean-
ors and felonies.268 For reasons explained earlier, that disparity is
an integral component of strategic undercharging.
The procedural gap between misdemeanors and felonies has long
rested on two grounds: (1) heightened procedures are warranted
only for offenses of a sufficient severity,269 and (2) the sole metric for
determining an offenses relative severity is the potential term of
imprisonment it authorizes.270 This Part challenges the continued
wisdom of the second ground and claims that collateral conse-
quences should also be considered when determining an offenses
relative severity. Under that approach, misdemeanor offenses car-
rying certain collateral consequences would trigger the same bundle
266. As Ronald Wright and Kay Levine document in their recent study about the effect that
experience has on prosecutors over time, [e]ntry-level and junior prosecutors were more
likely than their experienced colleagues to say that it is important to stick with the most
serious charges during plea negotiations. Wright & Levine, supra note 20, at 1087-88.
267. Id. at 1069.
268. Even when the procedural safeguards afforded to misdemeanor defendants are similar
to those provided felony defendants, the misdemeanor version usually comes in a watered-
down form. For example, while most misdemeanor defendants have a right to government-
provided counsel, the amount of funding provided to that counsel will pale in comparison to
what an attorney would receive if the case were a felony. See supra notes 244-46. Similarly,
a misdemeanor defendant afforded the right to demand a jury trial will typically be entitled
only to a jury of a smaller size than a felony defendant (for example, six jurors instead of
twelve). See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
269. As Alexandra Natapoff summarized this state of affairs, [i]f the United States
Supreme Court can be said to have a misdemeanor theory, it is that lesser punishments
should trigger reduced procedural entitlements. Natapoff, supra note 13, at 1350.
270. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text. The lone exception is the consti-
tutional right to counsel, which uses both a potential imprisonment and actual imprisonment
metric for purposes of determining relative severity. See supra notes 251-53.
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of entitlements typically afforded felony defendants. This would
better honor an important principle underlying the criminal justice
system: serious sanctions require serious procedures.
A. Reconsidering Relative Severity
Although potential imprisonment remains a useful proxy for of-
fense severity, the misdemeanor-felony line should no longer serve
as the sole litmus test.271 Instead, an offenses potential collateral
consequences should also be factored into the calculus.
The current prison-centric benchmarks for determining relative
severity were designed at a time when the overwhelming majority
of collateral consequencesand especially those generally consid-
ered most severewere limited to felony convictions.272 As explained
earlier, that is no longer the case.273 Now that many important
collateral consequences are triggered by misdemeanors, defining
severity solely in terms of potential prison time fails to capture the
full picture of an offenses potential sanctions and therefore fails to
capture the full picture of an offenses relative severity.274
This is true regardless of whether one views severity from the per-
spective of the legislature that enacted the offense or the defendant
charged with the offense. Consider the following (and fairly com-
mon) example. A jurisdiction creates an offense for misdemeanor
sexual abuse and caps potential imprisonment at twelve months or
less. In addition, the legislature requires a lengthy period of sex
offender registration upon conviction.275 It would be mistaken to
conclude that the legislature did not view misdemeanor sexual
271. For a thoughtful and thought-provoking take on the difficulties of drawing lines when
it comes to the issue of relative crime severity, see generally Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity
and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957 (2004).
272. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
274. When collateral consequences were effectively limited to felony offenses, little was lost
when severity was understood exclusively as a function of potential prison time. This is be-
cause a conclusion about an offenses severity would have been the same regardless of
whether collateral consequences were considered (since those consequences were confined to
offenses already considered serious).
275. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. In some jurisdictions, like New York,
a defendant convicted of certain misdemeanor sex offenses faces a maximum of only three
months in jail but will be required to register as a sex offender for a minimum of fifteen years.
See supra note 64.
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abuse as a serious offense simply because it declined to authorize a
higher potential term of imprisonment.276 Rather, the legislature
employed an alternative and additional penalty in the form of sex
offender registration.277
The same can be said when viewing matters from the perspective
of the defendant. It is far from clear, for example, whether a typical
defendant would consider a modest amount of additional prison
time to be a more or a less severe penalty than being required to
register as a sex offender for over a decade. Indeed, there is evi-
dence that at least some defendants are willing to risk additional
time in prison in the hopes of avoiding a severe collateral conse-
quence that a misdemeanor conviction now triggers.278
Accounting for an offenses potential collateral consequences
would reflect the increasingly central role such consequences
currently play in our criminal justice system. The collateral con-
sequences imposed on a defendant are often the most significant
penalties that result from a criminal conviction.279 The procedures
aimed at ensuring accurate and fair criminal adjudications should,
simply put, reflect this new norm.
276. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 762-63 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (Although
the seriousness of the prescribed [penal] sanctions is a valuable objective indication of the
general normative judgment of the seriousness of the offense, other evidencesuch as an
offenses collateral consequencesis available and should not be ignored) (citation omitted);
Schroeder, supra note 134, at 516 ([A]ny collateral consequence to an offender that might
result from a conviction for a particular offense is arguably relevant in assessing the seri-
ousness of the offense.).
277. At first blush, a legislatures decision to simultaneously impose a lengthy period of sex
offender registration for a conviction and yet cap potential imprisonment at twelve, six, or
even three months might make little sense. If the offense warrants a lengthy period of sex
offender registration, why would it not also warrant at least the possibility of substantial jail
time? The most likely answer is that legislatures wanted to expand a prosecutors menu of
charging options, thereby making it easier for prosecutors to successfully impose sex offender
registration requirements on more offenders. The menu analogy is, of course, from Professor
Stuntz. See Stuntz, supra note 88, at 2549.
278. See, e.g., Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 901-02 (Minn. 2002) (ruling on a defendant
seeking to withdraw guilty plea to misdemeanor sex offense on the grounds that counsel failed
to inform him of sex offender registration requirement); see also, e.g., Sames v. State, 805
N.W.2d 565, 566 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (describing a defendant seeking to withdraw guilty
plea to misdemeanor domestic assault on the grounds that counsel failed to inform him of
firearm prohibition); State v. Ortiz, 44 A.3d 425, 426-27 (N.H. 2012) (defendant seeking to
withdraw guilty plea to misdemeanor shoplifting on the grounds that court failed to inform
her of deportation consequences).
279. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
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One potential objection to considering collateral consequences
when determining relative severity is that it would create difficult
line-drawing problems about which consequences should be taken
into account and which ones should qualify as sufficiently severe.
If nothing else, the misdemeanor-felony line provides a clear point
of demarcation. Injecting collateral consequences into the mix
wouldeven if only temporarilymuddy that clean dividing line.280
Among other things, courts and legislatures tasked with determin-
ing relative severity would have to resolve at least three questions
when setting the parameters for the universe of relevant collateral
consequences.281
The first is whether to consider collateral consequences beyond
those imposed by the prosecuting jurisdiction. If a conviction in
state court also would trigger federal collateral consequences,
should those federal consequences be factored in the severity an-
alysis? The answer to this question likely depends on how one
resolves a more fundamental issue about relative offense severity:
should relative severity be viewed from the perspective of the de-
fendant or from the perspective of the prosecuting jurisdiction (that
is, its legislature)? If the former, then collateral consequences im-
posed by other sovereigns should be relevant to the severity
analysis. If the latter, then the possibility of another jurisdictions
collateral consequences being imposed on the defendant is largely
irrelevant, as it fails to reflect the views of the prosecuting jurisdic-
tion.282
The second question is whether to consider collateral conse-
quences that are not uniformly applied across all defendants. Some
collateral consequences, including firearm prohibitions and sex
offender registration, apply to all defendants convicted of a trigger-
280. This concern echoes one aspect of the familiar debate involving rules versus stan-
dards. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557 (1992).
281. I assume for present purposes that courts and legislatures would consider only those
consequences imposed by lawthat is, those consequences that arise by some form of state
action, not private conduct. See supra note 27 (discussing the distinction between
consequences imposed by law and those by private action).
282. This has been the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in the context of a con-
stitutional right to a jury trial: only those additional statutory penalties adopted by the
legislature that enacted the offense are relevant. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489
U.S. 538, 543-44, 545 n.11 (1989).
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ing offense, but some other consequences do not. Consider a federal
misdemeanor drug offense where a conviction would render a non-
citizen deportable. The sanction of deportation applies only to
noncitizen defendants. Should the possibility of deportation be
considered relevant for purposes of relative offense severity, even
though that consequence would threaten only some defendants
charged with the pertinent offense? As with the previous question,
the answer likely depends on whether relative severity should be
viewed from the perspective of the defendant or that of the prose-
cuting jurisdiction.
The third question is whether to consider collateral consequences
that afford the pertinent decision maker some degree of discretion
about imposing them or to limit consideration to those consequences
imposed automatically upon conviction.283 Under the current ap-
proach, relative severity is determined by looking at potential
imprisonment and not the actual amount of incarceration imposed.
Courts and legislatures would therefore need to decide whether
discretionary consequences are similar to potential incarceration
such that they merit considerationeven though the penalty may
not ultimately materialize.
The existence of such open questions should not obscure the fact
that a number of important collateral consequences would be rele-
vant even under the most restrictive approach: consequences that
are automatically imposed by the prosecuting jurisdiction on all
defendants convicted of the pertinent offense. That standard alone
would encompass, among other things, sex offender registration and
many firearm prohibitions.
After determining the universe of relevant collateral conse-
quences, courts and legislatures would also need to decide what
consequences qualify as sufficiently severe to trigger the relevant
felony procedure. This could be done either by identifying the
specific consequences that merit heightened procedures, or on a
283. See supra note 33 (discussing distinction between collateral sanctions and discre-
tionary disqualifications). For an interesting discussion about the American Law Institutes
recent proposal to fully integrate collateral consequences into a trial courts sentencing
process, including by permitting trial judges to grant relief from specific mandatory collateral
consequences at and after sentencing, see Margaret Colgate Love, Managing Collateral
Consequences in the Sentencing Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles of the Model Penal
Code, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 247, 263-73.
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case-by-case basis using a standard akin to the one employed by the
Supreme Court in the jury trial contextthat is, whether the
additional penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum
authorized period of incarceration, are so severe to warrant clas-
sifying the offense as a serious one.284
It is important to emphasize here that some procedural safe-
guards are required by the Constitution and others are governed
exclusively by statute or court rule. How and where to draw the line
may vary depending on the right at issue, including whether the
inquiry is geared toward establishing a constitutional floor or
instead about achieving optimal criminal justice policy.
I will not attempt here to catalogue which collateral consequences
should trigger which procedural entitlements. For now, my sole aim
is to establish that relative severityand, by extension, the pro-
cedural protections afforded a criminal defendantshould no longer
turn exclusively on the maximum term of incarceration authorized
by the pertinent offense. The next Section explains why there is
potentially much to be gained by including collateral consequences
in the relative severity calculus.
B. Implications
Applying felony-level procedures to misdemeanors carrying se-
vere collateral consequences could have several salutary effects on
the administration of low-level offenses.285 To begin, bolstering
available procedural protections would likely increase the intensity
of initial case screening by prosecutors, and in particular, encourage
284. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:24-1 (West 1998) (New Jersey
statute authorizing counsel for indigent defendants subjected to a conviction entailing
imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude (quoting Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt,
58 N.J. 281, 295 (1971)) (emphasis added)).
285. Because my focus here is on the relationship between the current regime of collateral
consequences and adjudicatory procedures, I do not discuss other potential reforms that also
merit serious consideration. For example, I am putting to the side arguments that legislatures
should cease attaching significant collateral consequences to misdemeanors or should at least
make them comparatively less severe (for example, creating a rule that misdemeanants are
ineligible to possess a firearm for five or ten years rather than for life). Similarly, reforms to
the method of assignment for misdemeanor cases triggering severe collateral consequences
in prosecutors offices or to defense attorneys also deserve more attention than I can give them
here.
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additional consideration about whether to charge an offense that
carries a severe collateral consequence, to pursue a different charge
that does not, or even to refuse filing charges at all.286 Extra at-
tention given at the screening stage would be a most welcome
development in the low-level offense arena, which is more often
known for its quick and deferential-to-arrest screening decisions.287
The implementation of felony-level procedures would also lead to
improved scrutiny and testing of the governments case after
charges have been initiated. For example, cases would be subject to
review by a grand jury or a judge at a preliminary hearing. This
review could at least weed out some of the weakest evidentiary
cases, in part by discouraging prosecutors from pursuing such cases
in the first place. Furthermore, imposing heightened discovery ob-
ligations on the governmentin addition to the free discovery
provided by preliminary hearingswould give the defense team a
far better picture of the prosecutors case than it typically receives
in the normal misdemeanor setting. Among other things, this could
help defense counsel learn where the governments pressure points
areor grease the wheels for a guilty plea upon better appreciating
the strength of the governments case. Either way, having more
information available, and available earlier, would strengthen the
ability of the defense team to subject a case to meaningful adver-
sarial testing.
The adoption of felony-level procedures for serious misdemean-
ors would also increase the degree to which prosecutorial charging
decisions account for the views of the local community. [T]he idea
that prosecutors should be broadly responsive to the concerns of
their community is one that runs deep in American criminal
law.288 Indeed, this commitment to community oversight is reflected
by the fact that 95 percent of all chief prosecutors in the United
States are elected.289 But direct elections are not likely to prove an
effective means of giving prosecutors guidance as to a communitys
enforcement priorities or of holding them accountable for the dis-
286. For a persuasive discussion of the benefits of increased screening at the outset of
cases, see generally Wright & Miller, supra note 95.
287. See Bowers, supra note 87, at 1709; Natapoff, supra note 13, at 1328.
288. Richman, supra note 166, at 960.
289. See supra note 170.
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cretionary decisions that they have already made.290 To the extent
that prosecutorial elections are contestedwhich itself is infre-
quent291they are typically focused on a few high-profile issues, and
not the low-visibility enforcement decisions of the sort at issue
here.292
More effective entry points for community influence on prosecu-
torial charging decisions are instead the petit jury and, where
available, the grand jury. As Daniel Richman explains, a prosecutor
concerned about conviction rates must make all her decisions in the
shadow of projected jury responsesthat is, at least, when the
defendant has a right to demand a jury trial.293 In such circum-
stances, even the mere possibility of a jury trial can bring an often
overlooked degree of accountability into our system of essentially
administrative justice.294 While this dynamic is not necessarily the
strongest of voices, the potential reaction of a group of laypersons
drawn from the community surely has a far greater say in how
prosecutors deploy their resources than ... any more direct mecha-
nism of political accountability.295
The adoption of felony-level procedures for serious misdemeanors
could have a related beneficial impacteven if a relatively small
oneregarding the communitys perception of the criminal justice
290. Richman, supra note 166, at 963.
291. See id.
292. Id. at 963-65 (Perhaps electoral or appointive politics will ensure that the com-
munitys preferences will at least be considered on some broad issues of the guns vs. butter
variety.... But the bulk of the discretionary decisions that prosecutors make turn not on such
broad matters of policy but on the individual circumstances of putative defendants, alleged
victims, and other such case-specific factors.) (citation omitted). Richman echoes the ob-
servations made by earlier scholars. See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3 (1969) (seeking to minimize injustice from exercise of
discretionary power); ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 38 (1930) (suggesting
that [a] balance between rules of law and magisterial discretion ... is perhaps the most
difficult problem of the science of law); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea
Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 41 (proposing a
model for regulating the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining).
293. Richman, supra note 166, at 973. Recall that a key motivation for charging a
borderline case as a misdemeanor is to avoid the possibility of a jury altogether. This is
especially likely in jurisdictions where prosecutors perceive the potential jury pool to be
comparatively hostile to the contemplated prosecution. See supra notes 184-87 and accom-
panying text.
294. Richman, supra note 166, at 975.
295. Id. at 973-74.
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system. Community participation in the administration of the
criminal law, the Supreme Court has observed, is not only con-
sistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.296 While
felony defendants receive a jurisdictions highest forms of due
process, misdemeanants typically receive something that could be
charitably called due process light.297 Treating misdemeanor cases
that carry grave penalties more like felonies and less like traffic
infractions could make the process seem more legitimate and fair,
thereby having positive effects on public confidence in the criminal
justice system.
Finally, applying felony procedures to serious misdemeanors may
result in some prosecutors and public defenders offices routing
those cases to more senior attorneys. Since these serious misde-
meanors would be treated as felonies from a procedural perspective,
prosecutors and defenders offices could respond by shifting respon-
sibility for such cases to the attorneys that typically handle felony
cases. This, in turn, could have several benefits. As noted, felony
attorneys typically handle lighter caseloads, and therefore can de-
vote more attention to each individual case. In addition, those
attorneys tend to be more experienced. The combination of smaller
caseloads and more senior attorneys would increase the odds of
achieving individualized and proportionate penalties in a particu-
lar case.
I do not mean to suggest that the extension of felony procedures
to misdemeanors triggering severe collateral consequences would
be all roses. Because the efficiency gains associated with charging
a misdemeanor would largely be eliminated, more borderline cases
would likely be charged as felonies in my proposed world. Defen-
dants would thus be exposed to further and harsher penalties,
296. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
297. To be sure, providing a defendant with a jurisdictions highest forms of due process
is not a failsafe against nonmeritorious prosecutions or erroneous convictions. See generally
BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO
WRONG (2011). The point is simply that whatever one thinks of the process afforded felony
defendants, misdemeanor defendants typically receive something much less. See Jenny
Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1093 (2013)
([T]here is little reason to have confidence in the outcome of convictions secured in our lower
criminal courts.).
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including the threat of increased incarceration and a slate of col-
lateral consequences that may not have been associated with the
misdemeanor offense (such as disenfranchisement). The imposition
of such additional penalties could have negative effects on the de-
fendant, his family, and society at large.
Relatedly, because increased procedures mean increased costs,
prosecutors might decide to forego some cases altogether. It is
unlikely that prosecutors could transfer wholesale all cases that pre-
viously would have been charged as misdemeanors to the felony side
of the ledger. Indeed, one of the main reasons prosecutors engage in
strategic undercharging is because they are stretched too thin as it
is.
Perhaps prosecutors would seek to mitigate the increased costs
by lowering plea prices, in the hopes of inducing earlier and less
costly guilty pleas. For example, prosecutors might view the mis-
demeanor-felony line as more permeable than they currently appear
to do and offer misdemeanor pleas for cases initially charged as
felonies. However, such an offer might be of limited effect if the
collateral consequence is so severe that reduced prison exposure is
of secondary importance to the defendant (such as a defendant
facing deportation or a lengthy period of sex offender registration).
In short, application of felony procedures to serious misdemeanors
might result in prosecutors declining otherwise meritorious cases in
light of the increased costs they would be forced to bear.
CONCLUSION
This Article explored the impact that collateral consequences
have on prosecutors and, in particular, their initial charging deci-
sions. It explained why the attachment of severe collateral conse-
quences to misdemeanor offenses is likely to have a gravitational
pull on prosecutors, incentivizing them to charge more borderline
cases as misdemeanors rather than as felonies. This is because a
misdemeanor triggering a severe collateral consequence offers
prosecutors the ability to impose significant penalties at a fraction
of the cost. Examining the effect collateral consequences have on
prosecutorial decision making also revealed an important and previ-
ously overlooked charging tactic: strategic undercharging. Finally,
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this Article explained why courts and legislatures should look
beyond potential imprisonment when assessing relative offense
severity and therefore determining the procedures afforded criminal
defendants.

